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HOLDING THE EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABLE IN
EGYPT
IMPEACHMENT: A LOSING CASE
Dr. Mohamed Abdelaal
ABSTRACT: This paper examines the impeachment mechanism in
Egypt after the 2011 Revolution and the 2013 events and the removal
of Presidents Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi. In doing so, the
paper will provide a critical analysis to the impeachment clauses in
both the 2012 and 2014 Constitutions, in an attempt to discover to
what extent the pre 2011 impeachment differs from that of post 2011.
Further, it addresses the issue of whether the recall election could
make a good alternative to impeachment in Egypt. Specifically, we
will briefly shed light on the history of the recall device as well as its
emergence as one feature of direct democracy. Our focus will then
shift to discussing the possibility of adopting the recall device in
Egypt and the challenges that might face such adoption. Eventually,
we will propose a recall provision that could replace impeachment in
Egypt’s current constitution.
AUTHOR: Dr. Mohamed Abdelaal, SJD, is an Assistant Professor of
Law at Alexandria University School of Law in Alexandria, Egypt,
and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Indiana University Robert H.
McKinney School of Law, Indianapolis, IN. He is admitted to the bar
in Egypt and is a member of the Egyptian American Rule of Law Association (EARLA) in Washington, D.C.
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Introduction
With a long constitutional history dating back to 1882 when it
was an Ottoman province, Egypt is considered to be the oldest constitutional state in the Arab world.1 Under the monarchy system, Egypt
had two constitutions, 1923 and 1930, neither of which installed
Egypt as a constitutional monarchy.2 In other words, in the Egyptian
Kingdom the king was not a symbolic figurehead, but rather a strong
political actor who ruled the state and was heavily involved in its administration.3 However, he was immune from accountability.4
After the abolition of the monarchy and the declaration of the republic in 1952, Egypt underwent the drafting and application of six
constitutions—1956, 1958, 1964, 1971, 2012, and 2014—in which
the president and his cabinet were recognized as active participants in
the day-to-day administration of the state under a semi-presidential
system of governance.5 However, the many presidential powers envisioned in these constitutions, as well as practiced under most of
them, revealed the president to be the sole executive, aided by only a
symbolic involvement of the cabinet.6
Most of the constitutions adopted in the Egyptian Republic were
guided by the themes of democracy, human dignity, and political accountability, as they were the outcome either of bitter battles against
colonial powers (the 1954 and 1956 Constitutions),7 or the overthrow
of authoritarian regimes (the 1971 and 2012 Constitutions).8 However, these constitutions manifest a remarkable ability to yield exceptions regarding political accountability.9
For the purposes of this article, I will examine the issue of political accountability from the perspective of presidential impeachment
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Egyptian Constitutions, MIDAN MASR,
http://www.midanmasr.com/en/default.aspx?PageID=15 (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sujit Choudhry & Richard Stacey, Chapter 5: Semi-presidential government in Tunisia
and Egypt, CONSTITUTION BUILDING: A GLOBAL R. 33 (2013),
http://www.idea.int/publications/constitution-building-a-globalreview/upload/cbgr_c5.pdf.
Id.
Egyptian Constitutions, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
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in Egypt’s Constitutions of 2012 and 2014. They were the outcome
of two popular uprisings and a bitter struggle against two authoritarian regimes, those of Mubarak and of the Muslim Brotherhood. Then
I will discuss the possibility of adopting the recall election as an alternative to impeachment in Egypt.
The Constitution of 2012
A. Background
Following the assassination of President Sadat, Vice President
Hosni Mubarak assumed the presidency.10 Mubarak’s first years of
presidency teemed with serious challenges. He was required to face
the escalating debt rate in Egypt, radical Islamists, and Egypt’s deteriorating relations with the Arab nations after the Egypt-Israel Peace
Treaty.11 Indeed, Mubarak did a good job during his early years in
the office of the presidency. His policy in suppressing the Islamists,
fighting terrorism in Egypt, and maintaining peace with Israel earned
him a close relationship with the United States and the West that
helped him to reschedule the country’s debt and to cure certain economic problems.12 Further, Mubarak succeeded in restoring Egypt’s
relation with the Arab nations.
Under his regime Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League13 after having been suspended as a consequence of the peace treaty with
Israel.14
10.

11.
12.

13.

Mohamed Hosni Mubarak was Egypt’s fourth president who served from 1981 to
2011. Mubarak was appointed as Egypt’s vice president in 1975 during the regime of
President Anwar Al-Sadat, and thus he assumed the office of the president in 1981 following the assassination of President Sadat. Michael Slackman, A Brittle Leader, Appearing Strong, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12mubarak.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0.
Id.
Id.

The Arab League is a regional organization of Arab countries in Africa and Asia. The
Organization was formed on March 22, 1945 in Cairo, Egypt. The Organization aims
“to draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing a close collaboration between them, to safeguard their
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Despite his acceptable performance in the foreign policy arena,
Mubarak did not perform well in internal and societal affairs. With a
steady growth in the rate of population to more than 80 million,15
continuously escalating prices, increased rates of inflation, high levels of unemployment,16 and a wide gap between rich and poor people,17 Egyptians suffered a severe deterioration in their societal and
economic life. Further, Mubarak’s regime was marred by restriction
of freedoms.18 For almost three decades, Mubarak ruled Egypt under
the grip of emergency law, which restricted individuals’ freedoms
and suspended several constitutional rights.19

14.

15.

16.

17.
18.

19.

independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.” Pact of the League of Arab States, Art. 2, League of Arab
States, ICNL, www.icnl.org/research/monitor/las.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
After ten years of suspension, Egypt regained its full membership in the Arab League
in 1989 and the League’s headquarters returned to Cairo after being moved to Tunis,
Tunisia. Profile: Arab League- Timeline, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-15747947 (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
In 2011, Egypt’s population reached 82,537,000 with an annual growth rate of 1.7%.
See, Egypt Country Profile, UNESCO,
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_Lan
guage=en&BR_Country=2200 (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
By the end of 2010, Egypt’s unemployment rate reached 9.0% and this rate jumped to
11.8% in the second quarter of 2011. See, Egypt Country Statistics, U.N.,
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=EGYPT (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
Slackman, supra note 10.
Daniel Williams, Egypt Extends 25-Year-Old Emergency Law, WASH. POST (May 1,
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/04/30/AR2006043001039.html.

Law No. 162 of 1958, al-Jarida al-Rismiyyah, 28 Sept. 1958 (Egypt). The Emergency
Law was first enacted in 1958. The law was imposed during the Egypt-Israel War in
1967 and was suspended after the 1973 War before being reactivated following the assassination of President Sadat in 1981 and has been in effect for almost 30 years during the regime of President Mubarak. See Williams, supra note 18.The Law authorizes
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Corruption in his regime also roused the Egyptians against Mubarak.20 In an attempt to secure his office and prolong his presidency,
Mubarak tried to take control of the institutions of the country.21 A
significant feature of corruption in Mubarak’s era was the rise to
power of businessmen who endeavored desperately to serve only
their own business interests.22
Another aspect of corruption was electoral fraud, which reached
its acme in the Parliamentary Election of 2010.23 At this time, the
government decided that the judiciary would not supervise the election,24 and it initiated a wide arrest campaign targeting opposition
figures.25 As a result of these practices, the National Democratic Par-

20.
21.
22.

23.
24.

25.

the president to take the required precautions to restrict the freedom of meeting,
movement, residence, arrest suspects or those who threat public security and public
order, to inspect people and places notwithstanding the provisions of the Criminal Procedures Law. Law No. 162 of 1958, al-Jarida al-Rismiyyah, 28 Sept. 1958, Art.3(1)
(Egypt). It also entitles the president to order surveillance on any kind of messages,
monitor, confiscate and close newspapers, leaflets, publications, fees and all means of
expression, propaganda and advertising before its publication. Id., at Art.3(2). Further,
under this law, the president determines the opening and closing times of public stores,
withdraws weapons’ licenses and evacuates or segregates certain regions. Id., at
Art.3(3),(5),(6).
See generally BRUCE RUTHERFORD, EGYPT AFTER MUBARAK: LIBERALISM, ISLAM, AND
DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD (Princeton University Press, 2008).
Id.
A stark example of such a selfishly corrupt and powerful business figure was Ahmed
Ezz, who served as the Organization Secretary of the National Democratic Party
(NDP), Mubarak’s ruling party. Ezz was the majority leader of the Egyptian Parliament, as well as the absolute monopolist of the steel industry in Egypt, with an estimated wealth of $3 billion. To further his own interests, Ezz significantly enhanced
monopolies rather than fighting it, backing every effort to thwart any legislative bill introduced in parliament that would criminalize monopoly. Likewise, Rashid Mohamed
Rashid, former Minister of Trade and Industry, had an estimated personal wealth of $2
billion, and Zuhair Garrana, former Minister of Tourism, was worth $2.2 billion. Tom
Ramstack, Obama Optimistic about Egypt as Negotiators make concessions, GANT
DAILY, http://gantdaily.com/2011/02/07/obama-optimistic-about-egypt-as-negotiatorsmake-concessions/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
Egypt Rebuffs U.S. Call for Foreign Monitors at Election, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/world/africa/19egypt.html?_r=0.
In addition, the government refused any kind of international monitoring for the electoral process, arguing that international monitoring would undermine the sovereignty
of the state and allow interference in its internal affairs. Id.
Mubarak extended the state of emergency just before the election, ignoring his promise in 2005 to put an end to the state of emergency and to introduce a terrorism law to
replace emergency law. In 2010, the Egyptian security forces started a wide arrest
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ty (NDP), the ruling party, swept the election with virtually no representation of opposition.26
Police brutality also plagued Mubarak’s regime. The 2009 Human Rights Report of the U.S. Department of State reported that “the
government’s respect for human rights remained poor, and serious
abuses continued in many areas,”27 and “security forces committed
arbitrary or unlawful killings during the year.”28 A notable incident
that sparked a massive wave of anger over Egypt’s police practices
and significantly contributed to toppling Mubarak’s regime was the
death of Khaled Saeed, who was severely beaten to death by police
officers after being identified as “suspicious.”29

26.

27.
28.

29.

campaign against anti-government political activists, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood after it announced its participation in the Election. Elections in Egypt
State of Permanent Emergency Incompatible with Free and Fair, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/11/23/elections-egypt.
The NDP won 420 out of 518 seats with a success rate of 81%. Independent candidates
won 68 seats, of which 53 seats were secured by NDP defectors. While, all other political parties won 15 seats, the Muslim Brotherhood won only one seat down from 88
seats in the previous election of 2005. Official Results: 16 Opposition, 424 NDP, 65
“independents”, AHRAM ONLINE, (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/5/1321/Egypt/Egypt-Elections-/Officialresults—-opposition,—NDP,—independents.aspx.
2009 Human Rights Report: Egypt, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, (Mar. 11, 2010),
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136067.htm.
Id. Further, the report stated, “[D]omestic and international human rights groups reported that the Ministry of Interior (MOI) State Security Investigative Service (SSIS),
police, and other government entities continued to employ torture to extract information or force confessions, [and that] police and the SSIS reportedly employed torture methods such as stripping and blindfolding victims; suspending victims by the
wrists and ankles in contorted positions or from a ceiling or door frame with feet just
touching the floor; beating victims with fists, whips, metal rods, or other objects; using
electric shocks; dousing victims with cold water; sleep deprivation; and sexual abuse,
including sodomy.” Id.

Wael Ghonim, an Egyptian computer engineer, political activist and prominent revolutionary figure, created a memorial Facebook’s page, Kullena Khaled Saeed (We Are
All Khaled Saeed), to commemorate Saeed. The page dramatically attracted many followers nationwide in support for Saeed’s case and against the brutal and oppressive
practices of the Egyptian police. In short, during Mubarak’s regime, the police force
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Perhaps the growing rumors that Mubarak sought for his son
Gamal to inherit his rule were the last proverbial nails in his coffin.
After many attempts to introduce him into Egypt’s political life,30
Gamal’s grooming process peaked in February 2000 when the elder
Mubarak appointed him a member of the NDP’s General Secretariat.31 Gamal later became the Assistant Secretary General and the
Secretary of the Policy Committee, which allowed him to play a large
role in determining how the ruling party should function.32 Further,
in an attempt to support his son legislatively, in 2005 Mubarak ensured that Article 76 of the 1971 Constitution was amended to allow
multi-candidate presidential elections.33 However, the amendment
also imposed further restrictions regarding the eligibility to run for
the office of president34 in a move interpreted by many politicians and

30.

31.
32.
33.
34.

was changed from being a tool for the people’s security to a weapon in the regime’s
hand to threaten and suppress the people. See WAEL GHONIM, REVOLUTION 2.0: THE
POWER OF THE PEOPLE IS GREATER THAN THE PEOPLE IN POWER 58-81 (2012). On
March 3, 2014, Alexandria Criminal Court sentenced two police officers to ten years
of aggravated imprisonment after they were found guilty of false arrest, using excessive force, and the manslaughter of Saeed. Appeals Court upholds death sentence, long
prison terms in Sidi Gaber Case, MADA MASR, (Feb. 15, 2015),
http://www.madamasr.com/news/appeals-court-uhpolds-death-sentence-long-prisonterms-sidi-gaber-case.
See Muhammad Abdul Aziz & Youssef Hussein, The President, the Son, and the Military: The Question of Succession in Egypt, 9/10 THE ARAB STUD. J. 73 (Fall
2001/Spring 2002). The first attempt to introduce Gamal into political life was in
1999, when rumors abounded that a new political party, Hizb al-Mustaqbal (The Future Party) would be established and funded by the wealthy NDP loyalists, and Gamal
would be installed as the party president, Id. at 75. However, the government denied
any attempt to establish the party, ending these speculations. Id. The grooming process
of Gamal continued when he was installed as the Chairman of Gama ͑at Giel alMustaqbal (The Future Generation Organization), a non-governmental organization
founded in 1998 to provide educational, housing and employment services for youth.
Id. at 84.
Jason Brownlee, The Heir Apparency of Gamal Mubarak, 15/16 THE ARAB STUD. J.
36, 46 (Fall 2007/Spring 2008).
Id. at 47.
Id.
See Brownlee, supra note 31. The amendment required that an eligible independent
candidate should secure the support of at least 250 elected representatives (sixty-five
members of the People’s Assembly, twenty-five of the Shura Council, ten members of
each of the Municipal Councils in at least fourteen governorates and twenty more from
some combination of the three). Id. at 47-48. Further, eligible candidates are to include
only “member of the party’s supreme board, provided that a candidate is a member of
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activists as an attempt from Mubarak to secure the presidency for
himself and his son after him.
All these circumstances contributed to the Egyptian Revolution
of 2011. Egyptians flooded the streets on January 25, 2011, protesting against police brutality and the deteriorating socio-economic situations.35 Political activists named January 25th Yawm Al-ġaḍab
(“Day of Anger”), as thousands of people demonstrated in Cairo, occupying Tahrir Square (“Liberation Square”), the icon of the 2011
Revolution, chanting “Bread…Freedom…Social justice.”36 Demonstrations and protests soon spread beyond the borders of Cairo to
reach other major cities such as Alexandria, Suez, Aswan, and Ismailia. Nationwide demonstrations and protests continued through the
following two days. Police forces stepped up their responses using

35.

36.

that board for a least one year, and that the political party completed five continuous
years and hold at least 5% of seats in both legislative chambers. Id. at 47. In 2007, another amendment to Art. 76 was introduced, whereby political parties, which have
been founded at least five consecutive years before the starting date of candidature and
have been operating uninterruptedly for this period, and whose members have obtained
at least 3% of the elected members of both the People’s Assembly and the Shura
Council or what equals this total in one of the two assemblies, may nominate for presidency a member of their respective higher board, according to their own by laws, provided he has been a member of such board for at least one consecutive year. See Nathan J. Brown, Michele Dunne, & Amr Hamzawy, Egypt’s Controversial
Constitutional Amendments, CARNEGIE INST. FOR INT’L PEACE 1, 11 (Mar. 23, 2007),
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/egypt_constitution_webcommentary01.pdf.
The 25th of January is Egypt’s National Police Day. Choosing the National Police Day
to demonstrate and protest indicates the extent to which people in Egypt were frustrated and disappointed with the police brutality and violent practices. Egypt Braces for
Nationwide Protests, FRANCE 24 (January 25, 2011),
https://web.archive.org/web/20110201013309/http://www.france24.com/en/20110125egypt-braces-nationwide-protests.
In fact, this famous revolutionary chant was a cunning selection by the protestors, as it
mirrored their demands for a better social, economic and political life. First, “bread”
refers to the people’s socio-economic demand for a regime that could get the country
out of debt, offer them employment opportunities and satisfy their essential needs. Second, “freedom” describes the Egyptians’ search for their constitutional-fundamental
rights, lost under Mubarak’s rule. Last, “social justice” was a catchall term that accommodated both the economic and political deteriorated situations. Specifically, the
term reflects the Egyptians’ desire for a regime that would maintain civil rights and
guarantees an equitable distribution of wealth and resources. See Katie Bridget Wright,
Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice: Understanding the Egyptian Revolution, LAKE
FOREST C. PUBL. (2013), http://publications.lakeforest.edu/firstyear_writing_contest/1.
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tear gas and bullets against the protesters and arresting many political
activists.37
After eighteen days of massive protests and demonstrations,38 on
February 11, 2011, Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that
37.

Egypt Protesters Clash with Police, AL JAZEERA (January 25, 2011, 10:26 AM),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112511362207742.html. On
January 27, Dr. Mohamed El-Baradei, former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, returned to Egypt in order to participate in the revolution arguing that,
“[T]he people have broken the barrier of fear. There is no going back.” Mohamed
Elmeshad, Back in Egypt, ElBaradei Vows to Take Part in Planned Friday Demonstrations, EGYPT INDEP. (Jan. 27, 2011 4:06 PM),
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/back-egypt-elbaradei-vows-take-partplanned-friday-demonstrations.

38.

See Ghonim, supra note 29. During these eighteen days, Mubarak made three televised
statements in an attempt to appease the angry protesters, yet he remained defiant, refusing to step down. Mubarak’s first statement was on January 28, 2011, id. at 216,
known as the Friday of Anger, id. at 190, which time he overthrew the government,
named General Umar Suleiman, the head of intelligence, Vice President of Egypt, id.

10

1 HOLDING THE EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Holding the Executive Accountable

3/21/16 6:36 PM

Vol. IV, No. I

Mubarak had decided to step down and had charged the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces (“SCAF”) to administer the country, a
moment much awaited by the Egyptians.39 Following this withdrawal, Mubarak and his family were prohibited from departing the country, and he and his two sons were prosecuted under charges of corruption and of killing peaceful protestors.40 In fact, Mubarak’s trial

39.

40.

at 216, making him the first vice president in Mubarak’s regime. Michael Slackman,
Choice of Suleiman Likely to Please the Military, Not the Crowds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2011, at A10. (The post had remained vacant for nearly 30 years). He also imposed
curfew in Cairo, Alexandria and Suez, deployed military forces in the three cities, and
promised the people to undertake a huge socio-economic reform, Ghonim, supra note
29 at 215. In fact, the impact of Mubarak’s was significant for the protestors, as they
became sufficiently confident of Mubarak’s weakness to become more insistent upon
the overthrow of the regime. Id. at 217. They chanted, “Al-sha ͑ab Yureed Esqaat alNizam” (The People Want to Topple the Regime) which shows to what extent the
Egyptians’ political awareness grew; they became so determined not only to force
Mubarak to step down, but also to end the whole regime. Id. As the protestors defied
the curfew and the severity of violence between police and protestors continued to escalate, Mubarak addressed the nation again on February 1, promising to ask the parliament to amend the constitutional articles concerning the term of presidency and
pledging not run in the next presidential election. However, he insisted on remaining
in power until the end of his term in September 2011. Id. at 232, ostensibly to guarantee a peaceful transition of power. Once again, the protesters did not accept Mubarak’s
speech and continued demanding that he step down. Id. As the demonstrations continued widely, on February 10, Mubarak made his third televised statement, amid great
expectations that he would resign his office. However, in this third statement, Mubarak
insisted that he would remain as the president until the next presidential election in
September 2011, but also stated that he would transfer his powers to the vice president.
Id. at 276. As a response to the stubborn Mubarak, protestors organized in massive
marches chanting “Leave means go, in case you do not know!” The crowd headed towards the presidential palace with the intention to blockade Mubarak and force him to
step down. Once he was informed of the people’s approach, Mubarak along with his
family, fled to Sharm el-Sheikh, an Egyptian resort city.
David Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down, N.Y TIMES
(February 11, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html.

See Patrick Kingsley, Hosni Mubarak Cleared of Conspiring to Kill Protesters in
Egypt’s 2011 Uprising, GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2014 2:53 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/29/hosni-mubarak-cleared-conspiringkill-protesters-egypt-2011-uprising. See also, Jason Hanna, Sarah Sirgany & Holly
Yan, Egypt: Ex-ruler Hosni Mubarak, Accused in Deaths of Hundreds, Cleared of
Charges, CNN (Nov. 30, 2014 5:42 AM),
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was the first occasion in the history of the Arab world and indeed the
Middle East in which an overthrown president underwent a public
trial.41
Immediately after the overthrow of Mubarak, the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) issued a Constitutional Declaration on February 13, 2011, pledging not to remain in governance
and to hand over power to an elected civilian government within six
months or as soon as parliamentary and presidential elections were
held. In addition, the Declaration suspended the 1971 Constitution
and dissolved the two parliamentary chambers elected in 2010. Subsequently, the SCAF ordered the formation of a committee to amend
certain articles of the 1971 Constitution regarding conditions to seek
the presidency, as well as confirming full judicial supervision over
both parliamentary and presidential elections.42 The amendments also included a description of the road map describing how power
would be transferred to an elected civilian government by virtue of a
parliamentary election followed by a presidential election.43 Further,
the amendments stipulated that the parliament should elect a constituent assembly to draft the country’s new constitution. The amendments were put into a popular referendum and approved by 77% on
March 19, 2011.44 On March 30, 2011, the SCAF issued a constitutional declaration including the approved amendments.45

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/29/world/meast/egypt-mubarak-trial/. On June 2, 2012, a
criminal court acquitted Mubarak of ordering protesters to be killed. However, the
Court found him guilty of not ordering the killing to be stopped, and sentenced him to
life imprisonment. Likewise, the court found Habib el-Adly, the former Minister of Interior, guilty of conspiring to kill the protestors, also sentencing him to life imprisonment However, Mubarak appealed the verdict, and the Court of Cassation granted him
the appeal and ordered a retrial, in which he was acquitted later. Id.
Ilhem Allagui & Johanne Kuebler, The Arab Spring and the Role of ICTs: Editorial
Introduction, 5 INT’L J. COMMC’N 1435, 1439 (2011).
James Feuille, Reforming Egypt’s Constitution: Hope for Egyptian Democracy?, 47
TEX. INT’L L. J. 237, 247 (2011).
Id.
Egypt Referendum Strongly Backs Constitution Changes, BBC (March 20, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12801125.
The 2011 Declaration was amended twice. The first amendment was adopted on September 25, 2011, and stipulated that one-third of the parliamentary seats were to be
filled by individual candidates, while two-thirds were to be filled by proportional lists.
The second amendment took place on November 19, 2011, and required ambassadors
and consuls to supervise the elections abroad, as it would be difficult for judges to
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After the 2011 Revolution, Islamists in Egypt started to emerge
as a major political power especially Al-ikhwan Al-moslumin (the
Muslim Brotherhood). Following the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood decided to practice politics in an organized form, and so established a political party, Hezb Al-horya w Al-͑adalah (The Freedom
and Justice Party).46 The Muslim Brotherhood became highly involved in political life, after having been during Mubarak’s regime a
banned group whose members were always prosecuted.47 The decisive electoral victory in the 2011 parliamentary elections was the first
occasion upon which the Brotherhood showed its canines.48 Under
the flag of their new party, Hezb Al-Nour (The Light Party), the
Salafists49 were fairly represented in the parliament,50 which guaranteed to the Islamists full control over the lower house.51 On June 24,
2012, with a 51.73% of vote,52 Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim
Brotherhood53 was sworn as Egypt’s first democratically elected pres-

46.
47.
48.

49.

50.
51.
52.
53.

travel abroad to ensure judicial supervision. Nathan J. Brown & Kristen Stilt, A Haphazard Constitutional Compromise, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Apr. 11,
2011), http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/11/haphazard-constitutionalcompromise.
Mohamed Abdelaal, Egypt’s Constitution: What Went Wrong?, 7 VIENNA J. ON INT’L
CONST. L. 200, 203 (2013).
Id.; see also Sahar F. Aziz, Egypt’s Protracted Revolution, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 2, 3
(2012).
Despite its proclamation that it would not run for more than 30% of the seats, the Muslim Brotherhood ran for 70% of the seats in the People’s Assembly (the lower house)
and won almost 50% of the seats. Sahar F. Aziz, Egypt’s Protracted Revolution, 19
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 2, 4 (2012).
According to Islamic jurisprudence, the word salaf refers to the earliest Muslims, i.e.,
Prophet Muhammad’s companions and their followers. Thus, technically, Salafists are
those who call for the understanding of Islam and its sources according to the approach
of the earliest Muslims, simply because they consider this approach to be the true Islam and free of foreign influence and interpretation. In Egypt, Salafists are considered
among the most extreme Islamists. Id. at 3.
The Salafists won 25% of the seats in the People’s Assembly. Abdelaal, supra note 46.
Aziz, supra note 48.
David Kirkpatrick, Muslim Brotherhood’s Mursi declared Egypt president, BBC (June
24, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-18571580.
Indeed, the Brotherhood initially nominated Khairat El-Shater, a prominent leader and
the deputy chairman of Brotherhood, as its first presidential candidate. However, ElShater was disqualified by the 2012 Presidential Election Commission due to the legal
requirement that a released prisoner is not eligible to practice his political rights before
six years has elapsed from the time of his release. Consequently, the Muslim Brotherhood introduced Mohamed Morsi as the alternate presidential candidate. Id.
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ident after the 2011 Revolution.54 In the same year, the Islamistdominated parliament elected a Constituent Assembly to draft a new
constitution for the country.55 The Assembly witnessed a boycott
movement from some of Egypt’s liberal figures and parties in objection to the Islamists’ dominance over its formation.56 On December
26, 2012, the constitution was put to popular referendum where it
was approved by 63.8% with a population turnout of only 33%.57 In
fact, the constitution was sharply criticized by many Egyptians and
political activists for restricting rights and introducing a theocratic
rule.58 However, Islamists argued that the 2012 Constitution was superior to all of Egypt’s previous constitutions, and asserted that it
achieves great progress in the fields of individuals’ rights and freedoms, social justice, restricting presidential powers, and limiting the
presidential term.59
B. Impeachment in the 2012 Constitution
Article 152 of the 2012 Constitution established presidential impeachment by stating:
A charge of felony or treason against the President of the
Republic is to be based on a motion signed by at least one-

54.
55.

56.

57.
58.
59.

Evan Hill, The villa and the ministry, AL JAZEERA (June 18, 2012),
http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/middleeast/villa-and-ministry.
The 2012 Constituent Assembly was composed of 100 members−39 seats for parliamentary members and 61 seats for independent members (6 seats for judges, 13 seats
for labor unions, 21 seats for public figures, 9 seats for law experts, 5 seats for the AlAzhar institute, 4 seats for the Coptic Orthodox Church, a seat for the armed forces, a
seat for the police, and a seat for the Ministry of Justice). The Assembly was heavily
dominated by the Islamists. Specifically, Islamic parties, with 16 seats for the Freedom and Justice Party (the Muslim Brotherhood’s party) and 8 seats for the Light Party (the Salafists’ party), comprised 24 out of the 39 parliamentary seats. Further, the
Islamists desperately sought for the nine seats of the law experts to be filled by those
who belong ideologically to the Islamic bloc in Egypt. Abdelaal, supra note 46, at 203
n.18.
For instance, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Hezb Al-Karama (The Dignity Party), and the
Coptic Orthodox Church announced their withdrawal from the Assembly in objection
to the Islamists’ dominance. Id.
Id. at 200 n.2.
For more information see Mohamed Abdelaal, Egypt’s Constitution: What Went
Wrong?, 7 VIENNA J. ON INT’L CONST. L. 200, 203 (2013).
Abdelaal, supra note 46.
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third of the members of the House or Representatives.60 A
decision to impeach is to be issued only by a two-thirds majority vote of the members of the House of Representatives.61 As soon as an impeachment decision is reached, the
president ceases all work. This should be treated a temporary impediment that prevents the President of the Republic
from assuming his responsibilities.62
At the outset, Article 152 listed high treason and felony as two
offenses that merit impeachment if committed by the president.63 Unlike Article 85 of the 1971 Constitution, which extended the scope of
impeachable offenses to include high treason or any criminal crime,
Article 152 limits the scope to include only high treason or felony.64
Regarding the first offense, given that Article 152 failed to define the
crime of high treason and that Law No. 247/1956 lacks a definition,65
the definition of a high treason crime should be determined according
to the penal code as well as Law No. 79/1958, regarding the prosecu-

60.
61.
62.

63.
64.

CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 152.
Id.
According to Article 153, “if a temporary impediment prevents the President from exercising his duties, the Prime Minister takes over his responsibilities.” Id. at art. 153.
Thus, since Article 152 treats presidential impeachment as a “temporary impediment,”
the prime minister should assume the presidency until a verdict is reached in the impeachment case. Id. at art. 152.
Id.
Id.; CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Sept. 11, 1971, as amended, May
22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007.

65.

Law No. 247/1956 served under the Constitution of 1956 and regulated the trial of the
president and the ministers. It impeached the president for the commission of treason
or disloyalty to the republic regime, and listed acts of disloyalty to the republic regime
to be: (a) seeking to overthrow the republic regime in favor of a monarchy;
(b) or suspending all or part of the country’s constitution or amending its provisions without
following the terms and rules prescribed in the constitution. However, it did not define
what is meant by the crime of treason as an impeachable offense. According to the
explanatory memorandum of the law, acts that constitute the crime of treason are to be
determined according to provisions of the penal code. Law No. 247 of 1956, AlJarida al-Rismiyyah, 14 June 1956 (Egypt).
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tion of ministers in both the Egyptian and Syrian territories, after
Egypt had entered a political union with Syria in 1958.66
On the other hand, Article 152 listed felony as the second category of impeachable offense. As mentioned above, the Egyptian penal code classifies crimes as felonies, misdemeanors, or violations,
and it defines felonies as crimes that are punished with death, life imprisonment, aggravated imprisonment, and imprisonment.67 Consequently, according to Article 152, impeachment procedures should be
invoked against the president if he commits a crime that is punishable
by death, life imprisonment, aggravated imprisonment, or imprisonment.
Regarding the question of how to impeach, the 2012 Constitution
followed that of 1971 by Article 152’s requirement that at least onethird of the members of the House of Representatives support the impeachment resolution against the president to be considered, and that
an impeachment decision against him requires a two-thirds majority
vote to pass.68 As mentioned earlier, the requirement of special majorities is likely to hinder any attempt to render the executive accountable for his misconduct, since such majorities are required just
to submit an impeachment resolution and to indict.69 Indeed, the role
of the investigation committee found in Article 10 of Law No.
247/1956, to investigate the impeachment resolution and ensure its
seriousness, is likely to help prevent malicious resolutions without
requiring a special majority to submit such resolutions in the legisla66.

67.
68.
69.

Law No. 79/1958 was issued by a presidential decree with the force of law on June 22,
1958, and replaced the provisions of Law No. 247/1956 regarding the prosecution of
ministers. The law did not address the possibility to impeach the president; however,
it only called for impeaching ministers if they committed certain crimes such as, “(1)
high treason; (2) violation of the basic provisions in the constitution; (3) any act or behavior that causes an increase or decrease in prices of commodities, real estate, governmental securities, or securities of the stock markets to obtain a personal benefit or
for a third party; (4) influence peddling; (5) deliberate violation of laws and regulations that costs the state or a public domain entity a financial loss; (6) any act or behavior that means an interference in the work of the judiciary or any entity with judicial jurisdiction; and (7) interference in the election or the referendum process to direct
its result either by issuing illegal orders or using illegal procedures.” Law No. 79 of
1958, al-Jarida al-Rismiyyah, 22 June 1958 (Egypt).
Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), al-Jarida alRismiyyah, Aug. 1937 (Egypt).
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 152.
Id.
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tive chamber.70 Likewise, a two-thirds majority to indict the executive could be a further obstacle to thwart the impeachment process,
especially if such a special majority is required to convict.
In determining the court of impeachment, it should be noted that
the 2012 Constitution followed that of 1971 in establishing a bicameral legislature, the House of Representatives and the Shura Council.71 However, unlike the 1971 Constitution, which assigns the
Shura Council with only consultative functions, the 2012 Constitution followed that of 1971 in establishing a bicameral legislature, the
House of Representatives and the Shura Council.72 However, unlike
the 1971 Constitution which assigns the Shura Council with only
consultative functions, the 2012 Constitution expands the functions
of the Shura Council to include passing laws,73 assuming legislative
powers that were previously shared with the House of Representatives in case this latter is dissolved,74 and approving the presidential
appointments of the chairmen of the independent bodies and supervisory organs.75
However, the 2012 Constitution did not designate the Shura
Council as the court of impeachment to try the president after being
impeached by the House of Representatives; rather, it assigned a special tribunal for this task.76 Specifically, Article 152 stipulates:
The President of the Republic is to be tried before a special
court headed by the President of the High Council of Judges
and staffed by the senior deputies of the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court and the State Council, and the
two most senior presidents of the appeals courts. The Public
Prosecutor assumes the role of prosecutor. If the most senior person is unable to play his part, the person next in seniority takes his place.77

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Law No. 247 of 1956, Al-Jarida al-Rismiyyah, 14 June 1956 (Egypt).
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 82.
“The legislative power consists of the House of Representatives and the Consultative
Assembly. Each exercises its authority in accordance with the Constitution.” Id.
Id. at art. 102.
Id. at art. 131.
Id. at art. 202.
Id. at art. 152.
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 152.
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In fact, a cursory examination of this special court reveals that it
has a predominantly judicial formation. Unlike, Article one of Law
No. 247/1956, which designated a special court of twelve members
(half of them are parliamentary members) to try the president, the
court of impeachment designated by Article 152 of the 2012 Constitution did not include any parliamentary representation.
Once again, Article 152 reduced the parliamentary role in the
impeachment trial when it assigned the Public Prosecutor the task of
presenting the case against the president instead of requiring the
House of Representatives to appoint managers to do so.78 In practice,
designating the Public Prosecutor to present the impeachment case
against the president is likely to hurt the neutrality of the case. More
precisely, according to Article 173, the Public Prosecutor is appointed by the president upon a recommendation from the Supreme Council of Judges.79 Consequently, the president is directly involved in the
appointment of the Public Prosecutor who would present the case of
impeachment against him, a situation that confers considerable doubt
upon the neutrality of the impeachment process.80
In determining punishments for impeachment, Article 152 requires the law should specify the sentence; however, if convicted, the
president is to be removed from office. Thus, according to the article, punishment for impeachment would be removal from office in
addition to sanctions prescribed in law, which in this case would be
78.
79.

Id.
Article 173 required the Supreme Council of Judges to choose the Public Prosecutor
from among the deputies to the President of the Court of Cassation, the presidents of
the appeals courts, and the assistant public prosecutors. Id. at art. 173.

80.

Indeed, one can argue that according to Article 173, the Supreme Council of Judges
plays the vital role in the process of appointing the Public Prosecutor by choosing him,
and that the role of the president is limited to issuing a presidential decree to enforce
the choice. However, in fact, a careful examination of Article 173 reveals that the process of appointing the Public Prosecutor requires that two different actors take two
separate actions: (1) the Supreme Council of Judges to choose, (2) and the president to
enforce the choice through a presidential decree. Thus, the presidential role in such
appointment is evident and indeed indispensable given that the Article 173 did not address the case of who should prevail if the president refuses the choice of the Supreme
Council of Judges. Id.
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the penal code as well as Law No. 247/1956.81 The penal code governs punishment for felonies−death, life imprisonment, aggravated
imprisonment, or imprisonment.82 On the other hand, Law No.
247/1956 sets the punishment for high treason−death or life or aggravated imprisonment.83 Adopting the approach of the previous constitutions, Article 152 ignored any mention of disqualification as a possible punishment for impeachment; however, as mentioned above,
according to Article 25 of the penal code, disqualification is an ancillary penalty that should be imposed in case of a felony conviction.84
It is evident that Article 152 failed to confirm the political nature
of the impeachment process. Specifically, the article neglected to define the crime of high treason as an impeachable offense against the
president, making referral to the penal code and Law No. 247/1956,
which lists criminal punishments for high treason, inevitable. Further, the article’s approach in designating the court of impeachment
with a purely judicial formation, lacking any parliamentary representation, raises considerable doubts, i.e., whether the impeachment process is of a political nature in that it requires the involvement of the
people’s representatives in the trial of the president; or whether it is
of a criminal nature in that a regular judicial court is sufficient to try
the president.
In fact, the 2012 Constitution would have been an ideal opportunity to adopt an impeachment clause to ensure the political accountability of the president, not only because it was the outcome of
a popular uprising that toppled a defiant dictator, but also because it
maximized the political role to be played by the president. More precisely, the Constitution designated the president as an arbiter between
the three governmental powers when Article 132 assigned him the
role of maintaining separation of powers.85
The concept of presidential arbitration was first introduced by
President Charles de Gaulle of France and was adopted in the French

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at art. 152.
Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), al-Jarida alRismiyyah, Aug. 1937 (Egypt).
Law No. 247 of 1956, al-Jarida al-Rismiyyah, 14 June 1956 (Egypt).
Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), al-Jarida alRismiyyah, Aug. 1937, art. 25 (Egypt).
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 132.
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Constitution of 1958.86 According to this concept, the president was
assigned a new role and thereby became more involved in political
life of the nation as his role developed from merely guaranteeing the
safeguards to enable each power to function properly, to becoming an
actual arbiter between them.87 Consequently, the political accountability of the president should have been raised to a level commensurate with his new political role, in order to help curb any official misconduct.
Ironically, the 2012 Constitution included a clause that is likely
to relieve the president from most of his political accountability.88
According to Article 141, the president assumes his powers through
the prime minister and the prime minister’s deputies and ministers,
except for powers of defense, national security, foreign policy, appointing the prime minister and civilian and military public officials,
representing the state and concluding treaties, declaring war and
emergency, issuing pardons and reducing sentences.89 Accordingly,
this article assumes two scenarios, both of which negate the political
accountability of the president.90 First, the article could be construed
to mean that powers − such as dissolving the parliament, enforcing
laws, setting out the state’s public policy, and issuing presidential decrees with the power of law − are to be performed only by the prime
minister, his deputies, or the ministers, without there being any role
for the president.91 In this scenario, the cabinet would be solely accountable for the consequences of such actions.92 Alternatively, the
article could be interpreted as designating the cabinet to be the prin86.

87.
88.
89.

90.
91.

92.

“The President of the Republic shall ensure due respect for the Constitution. He shall
ensure, by his arbitration, the proper functioning of the public authorities and the continuity of the State. He shall be the guarantor of national independence, territorial integrity and due respect for Treaties.” FRENCH CONSTITUTION OF 1958, Art. 5.
MICHEL BELANCER, CONTRIBUTION A L’ETUDE DE LA RESPONSABILITE POLITIQUE DU
CHEF DE L’ETAT 1276 (1979).
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 141.
Nariman Youssef, Egypt’s Draft Constitution Translated, EGYPT INDEP. (Feb. 12,
2012), art.166, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitutiontranslated.
Id.
Zaid Al-Ali, The Constitutional Court’s Mark on Egypt’s elections, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Jun. 6, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/06/the-constitutional-courts-mark-onegypts-elections.
Youssef, supra note 89.
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cipal, and delegating those powers to the president. Consequently, if
the president committed misconduct during his exercise of the delegated powers, the responsibility would be divided between him and
the principal (cabinet), and the latter would bear most of it.93
Finally, regarding ministerial impeachment, Article 166 of the
2012 Constitution granted the President, the Public Prosecutor, and
one-third of the House of Representatives the right to submit a motion to impeach the prime minister or a member of the cabinet for
crimes committed during or because of their tenure, whereas a decision to impeach can only be issued by two-thirds of the membership
of the House of Representatives.94 It is evident that the article did not
list impeachable offenses; however, according to Law No. 79/1958,
members of the cabinet can be impeached for the following reasons:
high treason, violation of the basic provisions in the constitution, manipulation of prices of commodities, real estates, governmental securities, or securities of the stock markets to obtain a personal benefit or
for a third party, influence peddling, violation of laws and regulations
that costs the state or a public domain entity a financial loss, interference in the work of the judiciary or any entity with judicial jurisdiction, or interference in the election or the referendum process to direct its result either by issuing illegal orders or taking illegal
procedures.95
Further, the article required the impeached official to stop all
work until a verdict is reached and stated that termination of his service does not preclude a prosecution. Ultimately, since the article did
not determine the court of impeachment and the trial procedures, Law
No. 79/1958 should govern these issues.

93.
94.

Id.
Id.

95.

First: Political Headlines, ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Jun. 8, 2006),
http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/MediaCenter/ForeignMedia/Pages/PressDetails.aspx?
Source=6781921f-3993-444a-859e-ee26ce851de8&newsID=0500a298-e562-48afa08c-cc8d2f0341b1; Law No. 46 of 1972 (Civil Code), al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 28 Oct.
1972, No. 77(2) & 119 (Egypt).
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The Constitution of 2014
A. Background
The Muslim Brotherhood’s gateway into Egypt’s political life
was the 2011 Revolution. After their recognition as a banned group
during Mubarak’s era changed to a recognized political power, they
established a political party (The Freedom and Justice Party), which
dominated the 2012 parliament with the Salafists, and their candidate
Mohamed Morsi winning the presidency.96
However, right from the start, it seemed that Morsi’s days in the
presidency were limited. Morsi’s dramatic fall started with his 2012
Constitutional Declaration. On November 22, 2012, Morsi issued a
constitutional declaration immunizing the Constituent Assembly responsible for drafting the 2012 Constitution from being dissolved by
the judiciary, as well as immunizing its work from being challenged
in courts,97 in violation of the 2011 Constitutional Declaration issued
by the SCAF that it would serve as the country’s fundamental law
pending the drafting of a new constitution.98 Moreover, the declaration dismissed the Prosecutor General Abdul Majid Mahmoud, who
was appointed by Mubarak, and replaced him with one of Morsi’s allies in violation of the Judicial Authority Act.99 Morsi’s declaration
ordered a retrial for those accused of killing the protesters in Mubarak’s era by the Egyptian courts.100 Further, the declaration immunized Morsi’s presidential decrees from judicial oversight101 and authorized him to take any necessary measures to protect the
revolution.102
96.

Freedom and Justice Party, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2015),
http://www.britannica.com/topic/Freedom-and-Justice-Party.
97. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 5.
98. “The text of law forbids any action or administrative decision from being absolved of
judicial oversight.” CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 23 Mar. 2011,
art. 21.
99. Id. at art. 3. “The Supreme Judicial Council considers all matters related to the appointment, promotion, transference, delegation, and loaning of judges and public prosecutors . [T]he General Prosecutor could [resign his office] asking to return to the judiciary.” Law No. 46 of 1972 (Civil Code), al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 28 Oct. 1972, No.
77(2) & 119 (Egypt).
100. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 1.
101. Id. at art. 2.
102. Id. at art. 6.
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Indeed, the 2012 Constitutional Declaration’s approach in immunizing presidential decrees, the work of the Constituent Assembly,
from judicial oversight, and dismissing the prosecutor general and
ordering a retrial for those who had been previously acquitted, upset
the general public and lead to massive protest movements against
President Morsi.103 Likewise, the declaration aroused the anger of the
judiciary to such an extent that the Supreme Judicial Council stated
the declaration was an “unprecedented assault on the independence of
the judiciary and its rulings.”104
In response to the declaration, Gabihet al-enkaz al-watani (National Salvation Front), a coalition of certain liberal parties and political figures, was formed.105 The Front asked Morsi to rescind the
declaration and claimed that he lost legitimacy when he refused to do
so.106 Later on, under the pressure of wide protests, Morsi agreed to
amend the declaration and to limit the scope of his immunized decrees to include only “sovereign matters.”107 Further, he agreed that
there would be retrials for those who had been previously acquitted
only if new evidence was presented.108 Nevertheless, these concessions did not sufficiently quell public outrage against Morsi.
In fact, it was not only the 2012 Constitutional Declaration that
outraged the general public against president Morsi. The 2012 Con103. Mohamed El Baradei described the declaration as follows, “Morsi today usurped all
state powers & appointed himself Egypt’s new pharaoh.” Michael Birnbaum, Egypt’s
President Morsi takes sweeping new powers, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2012),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-22/world/35512324_1_morsi-newpowers-muslim-brotherhood.
104. Egypt’s Top Judges Slam Morsi’s New Powers, BBC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57553859/egypts-top-judges-slam-morsisnew-powers/?pageNum=2.
105. Profile: Egypt’s National Salvation Front, BBC (Dec.10, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20667661. The National Salvation Front
was formed on November 22, 2012, in response to the 2012 Constitutional Declaration. The Front included a coalition of thirty-five political parties as well as political
figures and activists, all of whom belonged to the liberal-leftist bloc. The Front significantly contributed to mobilizing the public opinion against Morsi and the whole regime by heavily criticizing his policies. Id.
106. Id.
107. Egypt: Who Holds Power?, BBC (July 3, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-18779934.
108. Mohamed Fadel Fahmy & Jason Hanna, Egypt’s Morsi Says Court Can’t Overturn
Him, CNN (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/22/world/meast/egyptmorsy-powers/.
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stitution itself significantly contributed in escalation of the outrage.
Many Egyptians doubted the legitimacy of the 2012 Constitution for
several reasons including the low approval rating and population
turnout in the referendum, several boycott movements from the liberal bloc, the widely disseminated message that the constitution restricted freedoms and imposed a strict religious ideology, and the Islamists’ dominance over the formation of the Constituent Assembly.
Morsi’s poor performance as a ruler made matters even worse.
According to Morsi’s opponents, he desperately attempted to erase
Egypt’s moderate-diverse identity through his approach in Akhwanet
“Brotherhooding”109 the country by favoring his party’s fellows and
appointing them to leadership positions.110 Moreover, Morsi defiantly ignored the several calls, prompted by its apparent poor performance failure to meet the people’s economic demands and expectations, to dismiss the government..111 Further, police brutality
persisted during Morsi’s regime.112
109. Matt Bradley & Reem Abdellatif, Five Things to Know About Egypt Protests, WALL
ST. J. (July 1, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2013/07/01/five-things-to-knowabout-egypt-protests/.
110. Tara Rhodes, Protests in a New Perspective: A Discourse Analysis of the Arab Spring,
APSA Ann. Meeting Paper (2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2302074&download=yes.

111. Dahlia Kholaif, Morsi’s downfall hammers Hamas, AL-JAZEERA (July 10, 2013),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/07/2013710113757741999.html.
On July 24, 2012, President Morsi appointed Hesham Qandil as Egypt’s prime minister. Besides the fact that Qandil’s appointment was met with tremendous objections
due to his inexperience, Qandil’s cabinet also displayed a pitiful performance in dealing with Egypt’s economic and political challenges. For instance, instead of focusing
on how to develop and use the country’s resources, the cabinet depended on foreign
subsidies and aid, especially from Qatar, and entered negotiations with the International Monetary Fund to provide the country with a $4.8 billion dollar loan. Further, the
cabinet proved a great dismal failure on the diplomatic front, when it failed to reach an
agreement with Ethiopia regarding Sad Al-nahda (Renaissance Dam), which is believed to be causing a significant reduction of water availability in Egypt. On July 3,
2013, an Egyptian appeals court upheld a verdict dismissing Qandil’s cabinet and sentencing him to one year in prison for refusing to execute a judicial judgment to renationalize Tanta Flax and Oil Company after it was sold to private interests in 2005.
During Qandil’s cabinet, Egyptians continued to suffer from high prices, fuel shortag-
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The deteriorating security state in the country must also not be
overlooked. Morsi was blamed for failing to restore security after the
chaotic conditions that followed the 2011 Revolution. In fact, the security situation became even worse during his regime.113 Many Egyptians attributed blame for worsening the nation’s security to Morsi
when he granted presidential pardon for Islamist extremists convicts,114 including Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group), a

es, and power outages. Many Egyptians and analysts claimed that as a result of Morsi’s friendly relations with the Hamas government, he had allowed fuel to be smuggled
out through the underground tunnels in Sinai to the Gaza Strip, which caused the fuel
shortages and power outages in Egypt. Id.
112. Yolande Knell, Egypt police beating: The strange case of Hamada Saber, BBC (Feb.
4, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21330132; Egypt protester
El-Gendy was tortured: Security sources, AHRAM ONLINE (Feb. 6, 2013),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/64151/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-protesterElGendy-was-tortured-Security-sour.aspx. For instance, on February 1, 2013, protesters against president Morsi marched to Itahadia, the presidential palace asking Morsi
to resign his office and allow early presidential election. The protesters clashed with
the police forces as well as Morsi’s supporters. The police showed excessive force, using tear gases and snipers against the protesters. Moreover, on February 3, 2013, the
Egyptian media unveiled a video of a man who had been stripped naked, dragged, and
beaten by the police before being put in a police van. The man, who was identified as
an unemployed fifty-year-old named Hamada Saber, appeared on state television from
a police hospital where he claimed that he was beaten by protesters who took his money and clothes. However, after he was moved to a public hospital, he changed his testimony, claiming that he was beaten and stripped naked by the police forces and that
he had been forced to give false testimony, as he feared further police abuse. Further,
On February 4, 2013, Mohamed El-gendy, a political activist, died in a hospital because of the grave injuries he suffered after being arrested, detained, and tortured by
the police. Id.

113. Martin Chulov &Patrick Kingsley, Mohamed Morsi ousted in Egypt’s second revolution in two years, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-secondrevolution.
114. In fact, many of the released Islamist convicts were responsible for the hate speeches
against Egypt’s Christians and anti-Morsi activists. Indeed, these Islamists tried to implant in the people’s minds that those who oppose Morsi in fact oppose Islam and
God’s rule. Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, The Jihadist Threat in Egypt’s Sinai, ALMONITOR: THE PULSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST (July 22, 2013), http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/jihad-threat-egypt-sinai.html.
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prominent extremist Islamic group,115 and allowing them into Egypt’s
social and political life.116
In April 2013, Morsi continued to ignore the public outrage as
the severity of violence continued to escalate. A political youth activist group founded Haraket Tamarod (Rebel Movement) with the
intention of collecting signatures calling for President Morsi to step
down and allow an early presidential election.117 After announcing
that it had successfully secured more than twenty-two million signatures against the regime,118 Tamarod called for massive demonstrations on June 30, the first anniversary of Morsi’s inauguration, in
Tahrir Square and around the presidential palace.119 By June 30, millions of Egyptians flooded the streets nationwide in rage over Morsi’s
regime, and the popular chant Al-sha ͑ab Yureed Esqaat al-Nizam
(“The people want to topple the regime”) could be heard loudly.120
Amid these circumstances, on July 1, the Commander-In-Chief of the
Egyptian Armed Forces General Abdul Fattah el-Sisi issued a 48hour ultimatum, giving Morsi until July 3 to reach a political com-

115. Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (“the Group”) was founded in the early 1970 in Egypt for the
purpose of jihad, establishing an Islamic state and reviving the Caliphate system. The
Group’s activity was always accompanied with by extreme violence. For example, the
Group was responsible for the assassination of President Sadat in 1981 and for the killing of more than 100 policemen and soldiers in Asyut city in southern Egypt. Further,
in 1997, the Group was responsible for the Luxor massacre of least 62 people, most
whom were Swiss tourists, in Luxor city. The United States and the European Union
list Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya as a terrorism group. Tom Perry, Egypt’s Mursi frees Islamists jailed by Mubarak, REUTERS (July 31, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/31/us-egypt-mursi-pardonidUSBRE86U13K20120731.
116. For instance, on June 17, 2013, President Morsi appointed Adel el-Khayat, an Islamists who belongs to Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, as governor of Luxor, a major tourism
city in Egypt. In fact, the appointment sparked the anger of the Egyptians since it is
know that Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya was linked to the Luxor massacre. Id.
117. Mbaye Lo, Morsi, the last caliph-president of Egypt, MONDOWEISS (July 28, 2013),
http://mondoweiss.net/2013/07/morsi-the-last-caliph-president-of-egypt.
118. Nada Hussein Rashwan, Egypt’s ‘Rebel’ Campaign Gathered 22 mn Signatures, Says
Spokesman, AHRAM ONLINE (June 29, 2013),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/75244/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-Rebelcampaign-gathered—mn-signatures,-say.aspx.
119. Egypt on the Brink: Nationwide Protests Call for Morsi’s Ouster, N.Y. POST (June 30,
2013), http://nypost.com/2013/06/30/egypt-on-the-brink-nationwide-protests-call-formorsis-ouster/.
120. Id.
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promise and meet the demands of the people.121 The following day,
as the Army’s ultimatum deadline approached, Morsi addressed the
nation rejecting the Army’s ultimatum and refusing to resign declaring “he would defend legitimacy and his office with his life”122
By the end of the ultimatum and under the pressure of massive
demonstrations, on July 3, General El-Sisi announced that Morsi was
removed from power.123 Further, General El-Sisi announced the suspension of the 2012 Constitution and installed Chief Justice Adly
Mansour as an interim president during a transition period until a new
constitution could be drafted and new presidential and parliamentary
elections could be held.124
Following his ousting, Morsi was arrested and detained.125 Further, the Egyptian Public Prosecution Authority charged him and
leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood with inciting police forces and
their allies to kill the protesters,126 and with collaboration with a foreign entity to escape from prison after the 2011 Revolution.127 Morsi
121. Salma Abdelaziz, Reza Sayah & Ben Wedeman, Egypt’s military gives Morsy ultimatum, CNN (July 2, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/01/world/meast/egyptprotests/index.html?hpt=hp_t1.
122. Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi Defiant as Protest Deaths Rise, BBC (July 3, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23154233. In fact, Morsi’s opponents
saw this statement as the green light to his supporters and allies to crack down on his
protesters and demonstrators. Likewise, many analysts as well as political activists interpreted the president’s statement to mean a call for a civil war. Id.
123. David Kirkpatrick, Army Ousts Egypt’s President; Morsi is Taken Into Military Custody, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html?_r=0.
124. Id.
125. What’s Become of Egypt’s Morsi, BBC (June 16, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24772806.
126. The Prosecution Authority based the accusation against Morsi on the events that took
place in December 2012, when masses of protesters organized a sit-in at the presidential palace and the security forces were so reluctant to protect the palace. Consequently, leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood called their supporters to defend the palace and
the president. As president Morsi did nothing regarding this call, many of the Brotherhood and the president supporters attacked the protestors causing many injuries and
deaths among them. Id.
127. During the events of the 2011 Revolution, on January 28, president Morsi was arrested
and detained in Wadi el-Natroun, before being released along with some fellows in the
Muslim Brotherhood two days later under suspicious circumstances. Indeed, amid the
chaotic atmosphere that accompanied the 2011 Revolution, many prisons were broken
into by unknown people and thousands of prisoners, including president Morsi, were
able to escape. In June 2013, while investigating a case against an inmate who had
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made his first appearance in court on November 4, 2013, making him
the second Egyptian president to be criminally prosecuted in almost
three years.128
Pursuant to a constitutional declaration issued on July 8, 2013, a
ten-member committee of legal experts was formed by a presidential
decree to amend the Constitution of 2012 before having these
amendments discussed by a fifty-member committee representing
major stakeholders in Egyptian society.129 The amended constitutional copy was approved in a public referendum in January 2014.130
B. Impeachment in the 2014 Constitution
Article 159 of the 2014 Constitution provides,
A charge of violating the provisions of the Constitution,
high treason or any other felony against the President of the
Republic is to be based on a motion signed by at least a majority of the members of the House of Representatives. An
impeachment can only be issued by a two-thirds majority of
the members of the House of Representatives and after an
investigation to be carried out by the Prosecutor General. If
there is an impediment, he is to be replaced by one of his assistants.131

128.
129.

130.
131.

fled, and after hearing the testimonies of police officials and intelligence agents, Ismailia Criminal Court blamed the Palestinian militant group Hamas for helping the prisoners to escape during the revolution including those detained in Wadi el-Natroun.
Further, the Court emphasized that strong evidence confirms that president Morsi and
the Brotherhood’s leaders conspired with Hamas for the jailbreak. Id.
Kirkpatrick, supra note 123.
According to Article 28 of the declaration, two members of the Supreme Constitutional Court and its College of Commissioners, and two of the judges of the State Council,
and four constitutional law professors should be represented in the Committee of Ten.
Article 29 provided that members of the Committee of Fifty should represent Political
parties, Workers, Peasants, Members of Labor Unions and Federations, National
Councils, Churches, Al-Azhar, Armed Forces, Police, and Public figures. Also, the
committee should include at least ten youth from both sexes. Mohamed Abdelaal, Reforming the Constitution of Egypt: An Ugly Institutional Competition, C.J.I.C.L. (Mar.
25, 2015), http://cjicl.org.uk/2015/03/25/reforming-the-constitution-of-egypt-an-uglyinstitutional-competition/.
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014.
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 159.
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At the outset, it seems that Article 159 follows the same impeachment mechanism found in Article 152 of the 2012 Constitution,
with only two slight differences regarding the impeachable offenses
and the majority rule required to impeach the president. Unlike Article 152 of the 2014 Constitution, under which the president could be
impeached only for committing high treason or felony, Article 159 of
the 2014 Constitution added violation of the constitution as a possible
impeachable offense.
In fact, it seems that President Morsi’s misconduct (when in violation of the 2011 Constitutional Declaration he immunized his presidential decrees as well as the work of the Constituent Assembly from
judicial oversight) was the motive that urged the drafters to include
“violation of the constitution” as an impeachable offense when committed by the president. Further, listing violation of the constitution
as an impeachable offense enhances the political sense of the process
of presidential impeachment, given that criminality overshadows offenses like high treason and felony in the content of the Egyptian legislation and jurisprudence.
Second, unlike Article 152 of the 2012 Constitution, which required at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives to sign the impeachment resolution against the president, Article
159 of the 2014 Constitution requires that such resolution be signed
by a majority of the members of the House of Representatives.132
Despite that difference, both Articles require a two-thirds majority of
the House to impeach the president.133 As mentioned, requiring any
kind of majority to submit an impeachment resolution seems unreasonable since it acts as an undue. Further, a simple majority in the
House seems sufficient to impeach the president simply because a
decision to impeach represents the indictment against the president,
not the conviction.
In case an impeachment decision is reached, Article 159 requires
“the President of the Republic to cease all work [in which] this is
treated as a temporary impediment preventing the President from car-

132. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 152;
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 159.
133. Id.

29

1 HOLDING THE EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015-2016

3/21/16 6:36 PM

UB Journal of International Law

rying out presidential duties until a verdict is reached in the case.”134
According to Article 160, if the president encounters a temporary impediment that renders him unable to exercise his official duties, the
prime minister should take over the presidency.135 Consequently, if
the president is impeached in the House, the prime minister should
assume the office of presidency until a verdict is reached.136
Interestingly, the Article states that the House can only be convened to vote on impeaching the president after the Prosecutor General has investigated the case. The Article is extremely vague regarding whether the Prosecutor General should replace the committee of
investigation found in Law No. 247/1956, responsible for investigating the impeachment resolution and for filtering any partisan interest
or malicious motive. Further, the 2014 Constitution followed the
same course of the 2012 constitution regarding the appointment of
the Prosecutor General, stating that the Prosecutor General is to be
selected by the Supreme Judicial Council and appointed by a presidential decree,137 which again guarantees the involvement of the president in the process of the prosecutor’s appointment.138 Thus, designating the Prosecutor General to investigate the case against the
president could hurt the impartiality of the impeachment process.139
In designating the court of impeachment, the 2014 Constitution
adopted the same formation introduced in the 2012 Constitution, in
which Article 159 provided,
The President of the Republic is tried before a special
court headed by the president of the Supreme Judicial
Council, and with the membership of the most senior deputy
of the president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the

134.
135.
136.
137.

CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 159.
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 160.
Id.
Id. “Public prosecution is carried out by a Prosecutor General who is selected by the
Supreme Judicial Council from among the Deputies to the President of the Court of
Cassation, the Presidents of the Court of Appeals or the Assistant Prosecutor Generals,
by virtue of a presidential decree for a period of four years, or for the period remaining
until retirement age, whichever comes first, and only once during a judge’s career.” Id.
138. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014.
139. Id.
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most senior deputy of the president of the State Council, and
the two most senior presidents of the Court of Appeals.140
In fact, the approach of Article 159 in designating a special court to
try the impeached president is justified by the fact that, unlike the
2012 Constitution, the 2014 Constitution established a unicameral
parliament with only one legislative chamber, the House of Representatives.141 Consequently, the parliament lacks the upper house that
could be vested with the power to try impeachments. Notably, Article 159 failed to avoid the criticism that it does not include any parliamentary representation, which was directed at the formation of the
court of impeachment in the 2012 Constitution.
In addition, Article 159 did not follow Article 3 of Law No.
247/1956, stating that the House should elect managers to present the
case; however, it designated the Prosecutor General to present the
case of impeachment against the president before the court of impeachment, which is likely to harm the neutrality of the case.142 Further, according to the Article, the Prosecutor General is to investigate
the case before the House convenes to vote, and if there is an impediment, one of his assistants should take over such investigation.143
Moreover, the Article requires that if the Prosecutor General is impeded from presenting the case against the president, he should be replaced by order of seniority.144 Consequently, a situation could occur
wherein the Prosecutor General would investigate the case, but
somebody else would present it.
The Article requires that the investigation and the trial procedures are to be organized by Law No. 247/1956.145 Regarding punishment of impeachment, the Article requires the convicted president
to be removed from office without prejudice to other penalties.146 Ac140. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014; CONSTITUTION OF THE
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012 , art. 159.
141. Records from the drafting process reveal that the drafters of the 2014 Constitution
abolished the Shura Council found in the 2012 Constitution as the upper legislative
chamber, arguing that it costs the state a financial burden without having a real legislative function. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014.
142. Id.; Law No. 247 of 1956, al-Jarida al-Rismiyyah, 14 June 1956. (Egypt).
143. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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cording to Article 6 of Law No. 247/1956 and Article 10 of the penal
code, these penalties would be death, life imprisonment, aggravated
imprisonment, or imprisonment for high treason and felonies.147 Further, Article 25 of the Penal Code requires disqualification from assuming public office if one of the previous penalties is secured
against the convict.148
Interestingly, in the course of enhancing presidential accountability, the 2014 Constitution took an unprecedented step stating that
the House of Representatives may vote no confidence against the
president.149 Specifically, Article 161 stipulates that,
The House of Representatives may propose to withdraw
confidence from the President of the Republic and hold early presidential elections upon a causal motion signed by at
least a majority of the members of the House of Representatives and the approval of two-thirds of its members. . . Upon
the approval of the proposal, the matter of withdrawing confidence from the President of the Republic and holding early
presidential elections is to be put to public referendum by
the Prime Minister. If the majority approves the decision to
withdraw confidence, the President of the Republic is to be
relieved from his post. . . . 150
In fact, Article 161 reveals the concerns of the constitutional
drafters that after two uprisings, which toppled two regimes and severely affected the country politically and economically, a constitutional tool should be adopted to curb the presidential powers and redress presidential misconducts.151
Though these concerns are
legitimately justified, the constitutional drafters addressed them in the
wrong way. To be precise, subjecting the president to two different
mechanisms to unseat him, impeachment and confidence withdrawal,
reveals the great confusion the drafters had regarding systems of governance. On the first hand, a parliamentary vote of no-confidence is a
147. Law No. 58 of 1937, Al-Jarida al-Rismiyyah, 14 June 1956 (Egypt).
148. Law No. 58 of 1937 (The Penal Code), al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, Aug. 8, 1937, amended
by Law No. 95 of 2003, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, June 19, 2003 (Egypt).
149. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 161.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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mechanism known in parliamentary systems to redress the executive
where the president is a mere figurehead and the prime minister is the
real executive. On the second hand, impeachment is the recognized
tool in both presidential and semi-presidential systems to redress the
executive’s misconduct where the president is a powerful figure who
is highly involved in managing the state. Provisions of the 2014
Constitution reveal that Egypt is not by any means a parliamentary
republic, such as would be appropriate to include an article that the
president could be overthrown by a parliamentary no-confidence
vote. Further, despite the indispensability of having a constitutional
tool that effectively holds the executive accountable for his official
misconduct, the executive is likely to delegate most of his powers or
to refrain from taking crucial decisions if he feels restricted by prosecution or removal. Accordingly, an attempt to trap the president between impeachment and the no-confidence vote would be of no use.
Finally, the 2014 Constitution recognized ministerial impeachment when Article 173 stated that,
[T]he Prime Minister and members of the government are
subject to the general rules organizing investigation and trial
procedures, if they commit crimes while exercising the
functions of their posts or because of them. . . .In case of a
charge of high treason against any members of the government, the provisions stipulated in Article 159 of the Constitution apply.152
Indeed, a careful examination of the article reveals that it is untenably
vague regarding the impeachable offenses against ministers. Specifically, the beginning of the article subjects the prime minister and
members of the government to the general rules of investigation and
trial procedures if they commit crimes while exercising their official
duties, without precisely naming any crime.153 Next, the end of the
152. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 173. In addition,
Article 131 of the constitution granted the House of Representatives the right to withdraw confidence from the prime minister, his deputies, ministers, or their deputies upon at least one-tenth of the members of the House, whereas a decision to withdraw
confidence requires a majority of members. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF
EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 131.
153. Id.
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article subjects the prime minister and members of the government to
provisions of Article 159, regarding impeaching the president, if they
commit high treason.154 Consequently, the article considers high
treason as the only offense that merits impeachment procedures
against the prime minister and members of the government, whereas
provisions of Law No. 79/1958 should govern the impeachment procedures and trial.155 However, if the prime minister and members of
the government committed any crime other than high treason that is
related to the performance of their official duties, they should be subject to general rules of investigation and trial procedures, which in
this case would be provisions of the Civil and Commercial Procedures Code, Criminal Procedures Code, and Penal Code.156
In short, of fair assessment to the impeachment articles introduced in the 2014 Constitution reveals another failure in liberating
the impeachment process from the dominance of criminality. Despite
the fact that the 2014 Constitution introduced “violation of the constitution” as an offense meriting presidential impeachment, which
helped to emphasize the political nature of the impeachable offense,
it failed to define the crimes such as high treason and felony as impeachable offenses referring to Law No. 247/1956 and the Penal
Code, which consider them criminal offenses.157 Likewise, as mentioned in the context of the 2012 Constitution, designating a special
court with a dominant judicial formation without any parliamentary
involvement to try the president raises considerable problems in that
the impeachment trial excludes participation by the people’s representatives.158

154. Law No. 79 of 1958, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 1958 (Egypt).
155. Id.
156. Law No. 13 of 1968, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 5 Sep. 1968 (Egypt). Law No. 150 of
1950, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 15 Oct. 1951, amended by Law No. 95 of 2003, AlJarida Al-Rasmiyya, 19 June 2003 (Egypt). Law No. 58 of 1937, al-Jarida alRismiyyah, 8 Aug. 1937, amended by Law No. 95 of 2003, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 19
June 2003 (Egypt).
157. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22,
1980, May 25, 2005, Mar.26, 2007, Jan. 18, 2014; Law No. 247 of 1956, al-Jarida alRasmiyya, 1956 (Egypt).
158. Law No. 58 of 1937, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 8 Aug. 1937, amended by Law No. 95 of
2003, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 19 June 2003 (Egypt).
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Practicing Impeachment: The Case of President Morsi
An impeachment mechanism cannot be fairly judged until it is
tested. Specifically, carrying out an impeachment could reveal to
what extent a rigid impeachment provision is likely to achieve its
purpose regarding the clearness of impeachable offenses and the efficiency of the legislative chamber in weighing the official misconduct
and initiating the indictment procedures. Further, carrying out an impeachment tests the possibility of arguing and proving the official
misconduct before the court of impeachment and the ease of access to
governmental records.
The absence of a precedent in which an Egyptian president has
been impeached and removed renders the determination of the standards of impeachment a challenging process. However, this section
will create a hypothetical case of impeachment by subjecting President Mohamed Morsi to impeachment procedures. More precisely, it
will address the question of what might have occurred if the Egyptians had chosen a constitutional tool to overthrow President Morsi
and whether it may have been possible to remove him through impeachment.
Before proceeding to answer this question, it should be noted
that the motive for examining President Morsi’s case rather than
President Mubarak’s is that the ousting of the former is more recent
and had serious repercussions. Further, the fact that President Morsi
was an elected president who had assumed power through a popular
election urges consideration of his ousting as a paradigm for an impeachment case that might have happened.
In the course of determining Morsi’s misconduct, we should exclude crimes for which he is currently being prosecuted simply because most of them are criminal in nature, such as inciting the police
to kill protesters. Moreover, crimes that could be construed to mean
high treason offenses–such as Morsi’s alleged collaboration with a
foreign entity (the Palestinian militant group, Hamas) to escape from
prison after the 2011 Revolution–were, if true, committed before he
assumed power, though he was accused of them after his ouster.
Likewise, we should also exclude misconduct that could be classified
under the broad category of poor performance simply because impeachment is a very grave step that should not be triggered by a mere
mistake in governance or bad political decision, as long as such mistake or decision does not entail a violation of the country’s laws, con35
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stitution, or national interest. Further, it is hard to find a definite
measuring stick for poor performance, since what may be regarded
by some as a poor performance deserving of impeachment may not
be so in the eyes of others.159 Consequently, Morsi’s conduct in refusing to dismiss an apparently inefficient cabinet and favoring his
party’s members, as well as his economic and political acts, should
be excluded.
Having excluding Morsi’s non-impeachable misconduct, the
question becomes what misconduct can appropriately be considered
in building the impeachment case against him. One could argue that
Morsi’s 2012 Constitutional Declaration, in which he immunized his
presidential decrees and the work of the Constituent Assembly from
judicial oversight in violation of the SCAF 2011 Constitutional Declaration and dismissed the Prosecutor General in violation of the Judicial Authority Act, constituted an impeachable offense.160 Addi159. The Iraqi constitution of 2005 is the only constitution of an Arabic country that allows
the impeachment of the president for crimes, certain of which could be classified as
poor performance. Article 138(2) (D) reads, “The House of Representatives can remove any member of the Presidency Council by a majority of three-fourths of its
members because of inefficiency or lack of integrity.” Article 138, Section 2, Doustour
Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005. Ali Youssef
Al-shoukry defines lack of integrity to mean, “abusing using the office of the presidency to achieve material or moral illegal gains.” Further, he defines presidential inefficiency to mean “incapacity and inability of the president to perform the constitutional
functions entrusted to him.” ALI YOUSSEF AL-SHOUKRY, AL-TANASOB BAIN SOLTET
RA’YES EL-DAWLA W MAS’OLYATHO FI AL-DASATIR AL-ARABIA [PROPORTIONALITY
BETWEEN THE POWER AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE ARAB
CONSTITUTIONS] 170, 171 (2010).
160. In fact, the 2012 Constitutional Declaration raises the dilemma of the constitutionality
of constitutional acts, specifically, whether constitutional acts and amendments can be
subjected to judicial review to determine their constitutionality. The constitutions of
some countries grant the Supreme and Constitutional Courts such powers, such as
Art.146(a) of the 1991 Romanian Constitution. ROMANIAN CONSTITUTION, 1991, art.
146; Ion Deleanu & Emil Boc, The Control of the Constitutionality of Laws in Romania, 2(1) J. CONST. L. E. & C. EUROPE 119, 120, 124 (1995); Ioan Deleanu, Separation
of Powers: Constitutional Regulation and Practice of the Constitutional Court, 3(1) J.
CONST. L. E. & CENT. EUROPE 57, 63 (1996). See Yaniv Roznai, Legisprudence Limitations on Constitutional Amendments? Reflections on the Czech Constitutional
Court’s Declaration of Unconstitutional Constitutional Act, 8(1) VIENNA J ON INT’L
CONST. L. 29 (2014) (showing how the Czech Constitutional Court extended the scope
of its judicial review to include the constitutionality of constitutional acts and analyzing the court’s decision regarding declaring the Constitutional Act no 195/2009 coll,
on Shortening the Fifth Term of Office of the Chamber of Deputies to be unconstitu-

36

1 HOLDING THE EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Holding the Executive Accountable

3/21/16 6:36 PM

Vol. IV, No. I

tionally, his conduct in denigrating the judiciary in his public speeches, in which he blamed judges for acquitting Mubarak and his assistants and rigging elections and referenda during Mubarak’s regimes,
could be considered an impeachable offense. Further, his conduct in
issuing a presidential decree reinstating the 2012 Islamist-dominated
People Assembly, after it had been dissolved by a decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), was potentially impeachable.161
Ultimately, one could see Morsi’s decision to pardon the Islamist terrorist-convicts as an act that deserves impeachment, given that the
decision likely contributed to the worsening of the already deteriorated security status in the country.162
tional.) Despite the fact that the 2012 Constitutional Declaration was a constitutional
act, its legitimacy is highly doubtful as compared to that of the 2011 Declaration. Specifically, the 2011 Declaration was approved by virtue of a popular referendum, and so
gained its legitimacy from the approval of the public. In contrast, the 2012 Declaration
was a unilateral act issued by a mere presidential decree, without subsequent approval
by the public.

161. On June 14, 2012, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the parliamentary election that inaugurated the People’s Assembly was unconstitutional because one-third of
the seats were illegitimately filled because political parties ran for independent seats,
and ordered the dissolution of the entire legislative chamber. al- Mahkamah alDusturiyah al- Ulya [Supreme Constitutional Court], case no. 20, 2012. In fact, the
Court’s decision ignited the anger of Egypt’s Islamists and pro-Morsi who blockaded
the Court’s building to overturn its ruling. As a result, on July 8, 2012, President Morsi
issued a presidential decree ordering the re-institution of the dissolved legislative
chamber ignoring the Court’s decision. See Mohamed Abdelaal, Egypt’s Public Protest Law 2013: A Boost to Freedom or a Further Restriction?, 9 US-CHINA L. REV. n5
(2014). Further, rumors started to leak that the SCC was considering dissolving the
Constituent Assembly formed by the People Assembly to draft the 2012 Constitution,
a matter which rushed the 2012 Constituent Assembly to vote on the constitutional
draft in brief all-night sessions. NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL OF THE ARAB SPRING 16, 17
(Yale Law School Occasional Paper, 2013).
162. Some politicians and activists blamed Morsi’s decision to release the Islamist convicts
for the turmoil and bombings that occurred after his ouster.
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The question, then, is judging these offenses according to the
impeachment clause found in the 2012 Constitution, could President
Morsi have been impeached? As mentioned before, Article 152 of
the 2012 Constitution lists felonies and high treason as impeachable
offenses if committed by the president.163 For the sake of discussion,
we will assume that Morsi committed this misconduct after the approval of the 2012 Constitution. The situation is that Morsi immunized his presidential decrees, dismissed the Prosecutor General, denigrated the judiciary, and pardoned convicted Islamic extremists.
Although this misconduct seems to have been a clear violation of the
2012 Constitution, none of these acts are considered felonies or acts
of high treason in the meaning of Article 152 of the 2012 Constitution. As mentioned earlier, according to Article 10 of the Penal
Code, felonies are those crimes punishable by death, life imprisonment, aggravated imprisonment, and imprisonment.164 Further, Article 5 of Law No. 79 of 1958 considers “every crime that affects the
safety or the external or the internal security of the state, or the republic regime” to be high treason.165 It is obvious that misconduct such
as violating the law and the constitution, denigrating the judiciary,
and pardoning radical convicts does not fall under the category of either felonies or high treason. Further, although the Egyptian Penal
Code punishes public officials who refrain from executing a judicial
ruling by imprisonment and removal from office, such offenses are
considered misdemeanors that do not fall into the category of either
impeachable felonies or treason.166 Consequently, it would not likely
have been possible to impeach President Morsi under the 2012 Constitution.

163. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22,
1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007, Jan. 25, 2012, art. 152.
164. Law No. 58 of 1937, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 8 Aug. 1937, amended by Law No. 95 of
2003, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 19 June 2003 (Egypt).
165. Law No. 79 of 1958, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, art. 5, (Egypt).
166. “Imprisonment and removal from office shall be the penalty inflicted on any public
official or civil servant who uses the authority of his position in suspending the execution or orders issued from the government, or the provisions of laws and statutes, or in
delaying the collection of funds and fees, or deliberately refrain from executing a ruling or order issued by the court or by any competent authority.” Law No. 58 of 1937,
al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 8 Aug. 1937, amended by Law No. 95 of 2003, al-Jarida alRasmiyya, 19 June 2003 (Egypt).
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Regarding Morsi’s crisis with the SCC, as mentioned before, the
conflict escalated when Morsi issued a presidential decree ordering
the reinstitution of the People’s Assembly after it was dissolved by
the SCC for its unconstitutional formation.167 In delivering its decision, the SCC firstly argued that Law No. 108 of 2011, which replaced certain articles of Law No. 38 of 1971 regarding the organization of the People’s Assembly, allowed political parties to run for inindependent seats as well as partisan seats in the People’s Assembly,
and thus one-third of the Assembly’s seats had been illegitimately
filled.168 In the second part of its decision, the court recommended
the dissolution of the entire assembly, grounding its reasoning on the
idea that since the 2012 parliamentary election was conducted pursuant to an unconstitutional law, Law No.108 of 2011, the entire legislative assembly must be declared null.
A fair analysis of the Court’s decision reveals that the Court’s
decision to nullify the Assembly’s partisan seats was valid because
Law No. 108 of 2011 allowed political parties to run for independent
seats, and thus there was direct infringement of the principle of equality. However, the Court’s decision to dissolve the entire legislative
chamber was highly questionable. At first sight, the issue before the
Court was only the constitutionality of Law No. 108 of 2011 in allowing political parties’ candidates to run for independent parliamentary seats and to the requirement that independent candidates include
which political party they were affiliated with in the final electoral
sheet.169 Accordingly, the Court’s approach in proceeding to dissolve
the entire Assembly is likely to be interpreted as having exceeded its
jurisdiction. Moreover, not only did the Court go beyond its designed jurisdiction by recommending the dissolution of the Assembly, it did so above the will of the people who had elected the As-

167. See Mohamed Abdelaal, Egypt’s Public Protest Law 2013: A Boost to Freedom or a
Further Restriction?, 9 US-CHINA L. REV. n.5 (2014) [hereinafter Public Protest Law].
168. Law No.108 of 2011, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 19 July 2011 (Egypt). “Candidates seeking membership of the People’s Assembly should present their application in the constituencies allocated to [independent candidates]. [This provision] should be applied
on candidates running on the list of political parties.” Id. at art. 1.
169. “The Electoral Commission in each provision should prepare two final sheets; one includes names of independent candidates and the other includes names of partisan candidates. Each sheet must include the status of each candidate as well as the party to
which he affiliates.” Id. at art. 2.
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sembly’s members. Further, it should be borne in mind that Mubarak
appointed the Court’s justices who issued this ruling and most of
them opposed Morsi’s rule and policies.170 Thus, their desire to dissolve the Assembly just for being heavily dominated by the Islamists
and the Muslim Brotherhood should be taken into account.171 Of
course, one can sincerely argue that the law is the law and a judicial
ruling must be honored regardless of the judge who issued it, especially if we know that Morsi’s intent towards the SCC was not innocent, either. Specifically, Morsi did not try to render the Court free
from the executive’s influence. The 2012 Constituent Assembly,
which was responsible for drafting the 2012 Constitution, deliberately “minimized the Court’s membership from 18 justices to 11” in an
attempt to control the Court and exclude justices who opposed Morsi.172 Likewise, the Constitution of 2012 followed that of 1971, granting the president the sole power to appoint the president of the
Court.173
One can sincerely argue that the law is the law and a judicial ruling must be honored regardless of the judge who issued it; however,
when a ruling is highly questionable to the extent of challenging the
will of the people, something should happen. Consequently, I think
Morsi would not have been impeached for reinstating the dissolved
Assembly simply because his conduct seems to have been an attempt
to correct the Court’s mistake given that the Court’s decisions are final and cannot be judicially appealed.
Second, given the tense relations between President Morsi and
the judiciary, the former engaged in a series of misconduct regarding
insulting the judiciary and degrading its legitimacy. For instance, in
one of his public speeches, President Morsi accused an Egyptian
170. After the issuance of the 2012 Constitutional Declaration, some of the Court’s justices
publicly criticized Morsi claiming that he has lost his legitimacy as a president for
seizing powers and immunizing his decisions and decrees. Id.
171. Id.
172. Abdelaal, supra note 46, at 210.
173. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 25 Jan. 2012, art. 176 (“Appointments take place by a decree from the President of the Republic.”) Law No. 48 of
1979, al-Jwida al-Rasmiyya, art. 5 (Egypt)(Further, the Court’s law provides that “The
President of the state has the sole power to appoint the president of the Court, while
members of the Court are to be appointed by the President with the approval of the
Supreme Judicial Counsel.”)
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judge named ͑Ali El-Nimer of rigging elections and referendums conducted in Mubarak’s era without providing any evidence.174 Further,
Morsi argued that at least twenty-two judges were corrupt and had to
be investigated and dismissed from the judiciary.175 According to Article 186 of the Egyptian penal code,
Whoever affronts by any of the foregoing methods, the
standing, dignity, or authority of a judge in connection with
a court action, shall be penalized with imprisonment for a
period not exceeding six months and a fine of not less than
five thousand pounds and not exceeding ten thousand
pounds or either penalty.176
Thus, in the meaning of the penal code, insulting or denigrating the
judiciary is a misdemeanor that does not belong in the category of
impeachable offenses under Article 152 of the 2012 Constitution,
which allows impeachment of the president for felonies or treason.
Third, Morsi’s conduct in pardoning convicts, while ignoring final judgments secured against them as well as the country’s surge in
insecurity, could be construed as an impeachable offense. Specifically, as mentioned earlier, Morsi pardoned many of the Islamic extremists who belong to Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group),
which has been responsible for many terrorist attacks in Egypt, and
appointed one of its members as the governor of Luxor City despite
being involved in the 1997 Luxor massacre of tourists. Additionally,
shortly after assuming power, Morsi issued a presidential decree pardoning twenty-six convicts, some of whom had been sentenced to
death for joining terrorist groups, inciting violence, and sabotaging
police and military facilities.177 It should be noted that one of those
pardoned convicts is Wagdy Ghoneim, who was convicted of inciting
violence against non-Muslims and funding terrorist militias, and has

174. Mariam Rizk, Egypt: Islamist to be Tried for Insulting Judges, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Oct. 12, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/egypt-islamist-tried-insulting-judges155750489.html.
175. Id.
176. Law No. 58 of 1937 (Promulgating the Penal Code), al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, art. 186
(Egypt).
177. Law No. 75 of 2012 (Presidential Decree), al-Jarida al-Rasimyah, 26 July 2012
(Egypt).
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been banned from entry to the United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom, Switzerland, and Bahrain for glorifying violence and
committing hate speech.178 Further, in September 2012, Morsi issued
two decrees whereby he pardoned 123 Sudanese convicted of military felonies and misdemeanors for entering Egypt illegally and being
present in prohibited military bases while carrying weapons.179
Of course, one may argue that pardoning convicts lies within the
limits of the constitutional presidential powers since Article 149 of
the 2012 Constitution grants the president such power. However, in
fact, given the chaos and surge of insecurity that Egypt witnessed after the ouster of Mubarak and during the regime of Morsi, pardoning
these convicts was apparently an unwise decision. By this decision,
Morsi, who was an unpopular president, aimed to appease Egypt’s Islamists and sought their support along with his group, the Muslim
Brotherhood, in an attempt to form a coalition to stand against
Egypt’s liberal bloc. Despite the fact that pardoning convicts is a
constitutional presidential power, Morsi’s conduct in pardoning Islamic extremists would likely be construed as abusing his presidential
powers. Specifically, President Morsi abused his presidential power
in pardoning convicts when he used that power to appease his allies
and gain a political victory over his opponents while ignoring the
country’s security interest; this was misconduct that deserved impeachment.180
In fact, impeachment has been and will continue to be an ineffective tool to hold the executive accountable for his official misconduct. As mentioned, President Morsi was unlikely to be impeached
because the impeachment clause in the 2012 Constitution failed to
define the impeachable offenses and focused only on criminal ac-

178. Law No. 75 of 2012 (Presidential Decree), al-Jarida al-Rasimyah, 26 July 2012
(Egypt).
179. Law No. 155 of 2012 (Presidential Decree), al-Jarida al-Rasimyah, 3 Sept. 2012
(Egypt); Law No. 157 of 2012 (Presidential Decree), al-Jarida al-Rasimyah, 3 Sept.
2012 (Egypt).
180. See supra section II. The catchall phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors” found in the
U.S. Federal Constitution accommodates non-criminal acts such as maladministration
and betrayal of the public trust. In fact, Morsi’s misconduct in immunizing his presidential decrees, undermining the judiciary, and abusing his presidential powers in pardoning Islamic convicts could be construed to mean maladministration and betrayal of
the public trust.
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countability. Given the fact that the impeachment clause introduced
in the 2014 Constitution greatly resembles that of the 2012 Constitution, the next president is likely to escape the grip of impeachment.
Accordingly, in Egypt, finding an alternative to impeachment in
holding the executive accountable for official misconduct is a must.
As mentioned in the introduction, we find the recall election to be the
best alternative.
The Recall Election as an Alternative
Direct democracy, which means “delegation of political decisions to the ordinary voter,” was the outcome of the doctrine of the
consent of the governed, i.e. that an official derives his legitimacy
from the consent of those who elect him.181 Consequently, direct democracy guarantees greater involvement by ordinary citizens in the
process of decision-making, especially when the legislative bodies
are mistrusted because of factional interests or malicious motives.182
Direct democracy encompasses the notion of recall elections in
addition to the initiative and referendum.183 On the first hand, the initiative enables ordinary voters to be directly involved in the process
of legislation in that they can submit petitions proposing constitutional or legislative amendments.184 A referendum entails “the referring
of a law or ordinance or any specific question to the people for decision at the polls.”185

181. Nathaniel Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative,
Referendum, and Recall Developed in the American War, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 11,
13 (1997); THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 12 (1999). (“Governments are instituted among men deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”) THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
182. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM,
AND RECALL 10 (1999).
183. Id. Proponents of direct democracy claim that, “Referendum, initiative, and recall are
nonviolent means of political participation that fulfill a citizen’s right to petition the
government for redress of grievances. Direct democracy increases voter interest and
election-day turnout, giving the citizen more of a role in governmental processes might
lessen alienation and apathy.” Id. at 11.
184. Id. at 2.
185. FRANK PARSON ET AL., A PRIMER OF DIRECT-LEGISLATION 3 (1906). Thomas Cronin
defines the referendum to mean “[referring] a proposed or existing law or statute to
voters for their approval or rejection.” CRONIN, supra note 182, at 12.

43

1 HOLDING THE EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015-2016

3/21/16 6:36 PM

UB Journal of International Law

On the second hand, the recall is a mechanism whereby ordinary
voters can remove an elected official before the end of their designated term.186 Nathaniel Persily argues that recall is “a method by which
voters check their legislators at the polls.”187 Moreover, Timothy
Power emphasizes the concept of direct democracy in a recall claiming, “recall elections are based on the principle that a popular mandate can be revoked by the people themselves, and thus constitute a
powerful instrument of democratic accountability.”188 Likewise, Delos Wilcox argues that recall elections “[guarantee the] right of the
people to discharge their public servants when these public servants
cease to be satisfactory to them.”189 Further, Thomas Cronin defines
it as “the procedural democracy device that allows voters to discharge
and replace a public official.”190
Recall, an efficient tool of direct democracy to discharge elected
officials, differs from impeachment.191 The common thread between
the recall and impeachment is their constitutional function in unseating an incompetent elected official; however, unlike impeachment,
which usually is initiated by legislators and requires a crime named in
the constitution, ordinary voters (citizens) can initiate recall elections
without requiring a specific crime to be committed by the recalled official.192
The recall device, which originated in the practice of Athenian
democracy, allows citizens to vote to expel a politician from office.193
Likewise, the Swiss customary law authorized citizens to vote to remove elected officials and councilmen before the expiration of their
terms.194 In the United States, the recall tool can be dated back to the
colonial era; it first appeared in the laws of the General Court of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1631 as a device to remove elected of186. Rachel Weinstein, You’re Fired!, The Voters’ Version of “The Apprentice”: An Analysis of Local Recall Elections in California, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 131, 133
(2005).
187. Persily, supra note 181, at 13.
188. TIMOTHY J. POWER, POLITICAL RIGHT IN POST AUTHORITARIAN BRAZIL: ELITES,
INSTITUTIONS, AND DEMOCRATIZATION 123 (2000).
189. DELOS F. WILCOX, GOVERNMENT BY ALL THE PEOPLE 169 (1912).
190. CRONIN, supra note 182, at 125.
191. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 133.
192. Id.; Persily, supra note 181, at 13.
193. CRONIN, supra note 182, at 128.
194. Id. at 129.
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ficials.195 Moreover, during the American Revolution, the Articles of
Confederation authorized state legislatures to recall delegates of the
Continental Congress appointed by them.196 The recall was also debated at the ratifying conventions; the New York convention proposed a constitutional amendment whereby state legislatures could
recall their senators.197 Further, the Virginia Plan proposed a bicameral legislature in which recall was to be applied in the national legislature.198 However, the recall provision failed to survive and was not
adopted in the federal constitution.199
The Progressive Movement in the west witnessed the rise of direct democracy provisions in the U.S. western states.200 However,
such states limited direct democracy to the initiative and referendum
without including the recall device. For instance, in 1898, South Dakota amended its constitution to allow its citizens to propose laws
through initiatives and to approve laws through the referendum device.201 In 1902, the state legislature of California amended the state
constitution so that citizens of certain cities could amend their char-

195. Joshua Spivak, California’s Recall: Adoption of the “Grand Bounce” for Elected Officials, 81 CAL. HIST. 20, 22 (2004).
196. “A power reserved to each state, to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time
within the year, and to send others in their stead, for the remainder of the Year.” THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. V; see CRONIN, supra note 182, at 129.
197. CRONIN, supra note 182, at 129.
198. “…members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the
people of the several States . and to be subject to recall.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 21 (Max Farrand, ed., 1911). Patrick Henry of Virginia
argued that the constitution lacks “a mechanism to ensure that senators would follow
the instructions of their states.” Weinstein, supra note 186, at 134.
199. Those who opposed a federal recall provision argued that it would cause the national
senators to serve at the “emotionalism of the people.” Alexander Hamilton argued that
the proposed national senate should be in some measure a check upon the state governments.” CRONIN, supra note 182, at 129.
200. Persily, supra note 181, at 15. Populists and progressives argued that impeachment
provisions in the federal constitution were insufficient to redress elected officials
claiming that “impeachment punishes only malfeasance in office, not misfeasance or
nonfeasance,” and that impeachment is hard to reach beyond the boundaries of graft.
CRONIN, supra note 182, at 130.
201. Steven L. Plot, The Origins of the Initiative and Referendum in South Dakota: The Political Context, 12 GREAT PLAINS Q. 181 (1992).
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ters by initiative.202 From 1898 to 1959, as direct democracy provisions continued to rise, many states and cities adopted the initiative
and referendum in their charters and constitutions as a means of direct democracy.203
In 1903, the idea of a recall was first adopted in the United States
on the municipal level when Los Angeles approved a new charter that
included the recall device.204 In 1908, Michigan and Oregon became
the first two states to adopt the recall device on the state level.205 Today, Nineteen states allow the recall of state officials;206 Thirty-six
states and the District of Colombia allow recalling local officials207
and Twenty-nine states include recall provisions in their statutes, allow the use of such provision at the local level throughout the state.208
Since the adoption of the recall device in the constitutions and statutes if these states, many state legislators and local officials have
been recalled. However, only two governors—Lynn Frazier of North
Dakota in 1921 and Gray Davis of California in 2003—have been
successfully recalled.209

202. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 135 (citing V.O. Key & Winston W. Crouch, THE
INITIATIVE AND THE REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 428 (G.M. McBride et al. eds.,
1939)).
203. For instance, in 1910, California cities of Alameda, Berkeley, Eureka, Long Beach,
Los Angeles, Modesto, Monterey, Palo Alto, Petaluma, Richmond, Riverside, Sacramento, Salinas, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Francisco, San Louis Obispo, Santa
Barbara, Santa Cruz, and Santa Monica adopted the initiative and referendum. After
being admitted into the United States, in 1956, Alaska adopted the initiative and referendum in its constitution. Further, states including Illinois, Florida, and Mississippi
passed constitutional amendments allowing the initiative and referendum. Id, at 13435.
204. Id. at 136. Dr. John Randolph Haynes, founder of the Direct Legislation League of Los
Angeles and a member of the committee to revise the Los Angeles charter, played a
great role in adopting the recall provision after he observed the role of the recall device
in Switzerland, arguing that it is an effective mechanism for overthrowing incompetent
or corrupt officials. Cronin, supra note 182, at 131.
205. Spivak, supra note 195, at 23; See also Recall of State Officials, NAT’L. CONF. OF ST.
LEGIS. (Sept. 11 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/recallof-state-officials.aspx#History.
206. Id. These states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin.
207. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 138.
208. NAT’L. CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. , supra note 205.
209. Id.

46

1 HOLDING THE EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Holding the Executive Accountable

3/21/16 6:36 PM

Vol. IV, No. I

Despite the fact that state statutes vary widely regarding the required number of signatures to initiate a recall, and the grounds for
recall,210 states are likely to follow the same procedures to initiate the
recall device. Specifically, registered voters should initiate a petition
campaign;211 once the petition meets the required number of signatures, it should be circulated to an election committee for review.212
Once the committee declares the petition and its signatures valid, a
recall election must be held.213
Internationally, Venezuela seems to be the only country that lists
the recall as a constitutional tool for removing a president.214 Specifically, Article 233 of the 1991 constitution provides that “[T]he President of the Republic shall become permanently unavailable to serve
by reason of any of the following events: death, resignation, or recall
by popular vote.”215 Further, a detailed constitutional mechanism regarding the number of signatures required to initiate a recall petition
and the percentage of the vote required to render the recall referendum valid can be found in Article 72 of the 1991 Constitution, which
reads,

210. Id. Only eight states require specific grounds for recall. These states are Alaska, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington. Most of
these grounds are limited to some forms of malfeasance, incompetence, misconduct or
misuse in office, violation of oath, conviction of certain felonies and misdemeanor, or
negligence of duty.
211. Elizabeth Mack, Comment, The Use and Abuse of Recall: A Proposal for Legislative
Recall Reform, 67 NEB. L. REV. 617, 625 (1988),
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1818&context=nlr.
212. Id.
213. Id

214. POWER, supra note 188. In Philippines, according to the 1987 Constitution and the
Local Government Code of 1991, elected local government officials are subject to removal by recall. A recall election may be called if either at least 25% of the registered
voters in a Local Government Unit or a majority of all elected official in this Local
Government Unit endorse it. In Brazil, Domingos Leonelli, a member of the Brazilian
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) submitted a proposal to adopt the recall device
to the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) arguing that “the notorious lack of accountability of elected officials is perhaps the leading popular complaint against the
political system.” However, the Assembly overwhelmingly rejected the proposal.
215. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA , Dec. 15, 1999, art.
233.
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[A]ll offices filled by popular vote are subject to revocation. Once one-half of the term of office to which an official
has been elected has elapsed, a number of voters representing at least 20% of the registered voters in the affected constituency may petition for the calling of a referendum to revoke that official’s mandate. When a number of voters equal
to or greater than the number of those who elected the official vote in favour of the recall, provided that a number of
voters equal to or greater than 25% of the total number of
registered voters vote in the recall referendum, the official’s
mandate shall be deemed revoked and immediate action
shall be taken to fill the permanent vacancy as provided for
by this constitution and by law.216
The recall device has only been used against the Venezuelan
President Hugo Chávez.217 The February 2003, the first attempt to recall President Chávez occurred when opposition figures campaigned
for collecting signatures against Chávez after a nationwide strike.218
In August 2003, Súmate, a Venezuelan volunteer civic society organization, succeeded in gathering and submitting approximately 3.2
million signatures to the National Electoral Council (CNE).219 However, the CNE invalidated the signatures, arguing that they had been
collected prematurely before the elapse of the midpoint of the presidential term as provided by Article 72 of the constitution.220
In November 2003, the second attempt to recall President Chávez commenced when the opposition began to collect a new set of
signatures in support of recalling him. According to the 20% of voters required by Article 72, only 2.4 million signatures are needed;221
however, the opposition claimed to have submitted more than 3.4
216. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA , Dec. 15, 1999, art. 72.
217. See generally OBSERVING THE VENEZUELA PRESIDENTIAL RECALL REFERENDUM:
COMPREHENSIVE REPORT (The Carter Center, 2005),
https://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2020.pdf [hereinafter VENEZUELA
PRESIDENTIAL RECALL REFERENDUM].
218. Id. at 26.
219. Id.
220. Id. In fact, the CNE was formed by the Venezuelan Supreme Court (TSJ) after the National Assembly failed “to reach a consensus and choose unbiased, nonpartisan representatives.”
221. Id. at 28.
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million to the CNE for verification in December of the same year.222
In April 2004, the CNE declared 1,910,965 signatures valid;223
375,241 completely invalid;224 and 1.192.914 signatures dubious with
the possibility of being reaffirmed.225 Accordingly, in May, the CNE
held a reparo process allowing owners of dubious signatures to reaffirm them.226 The outcome of this reparo was that 754,397 signatures
were accepted, bringing the total number of signatures collected to
2.5 million.227 As a result, in June, the CNE announced that a recall
referendum would be held on August 15, 2004.228 The referendum
was defeated when 59% of the electorate (5.8 million) voted in favor
of President Chávez to stay in office,229 while 41% (3.9 million) voted in favor of recalling him.230
The Case of Egypt
The overthrow of Mubarak and Morsi through popular uprisings,
notwithstanding the presence of impeachment clauses in the 1971 and
2012 Constitutions, reveals the extent to which the impeachment device is ineffective and very difficult to be triggered in Egypt for many
reasons. For example, as previously mentioned, due to the vagueness
of the impeachment clause means it is very hard to stand on the actual grounds of impeachment and that it only raises the criminal accountability of the executive, while ignoring political accountability.231
The weakness of Egypt’s successive parliaments significantly
contributed to rendering the impeachment device ineffective because
they were subordinate to the chief executive. Specifically, Mubarak
ruled the country for almost thirty years, during which the National
Democratic Party (“NDP”), Mubarak’s political party, was the ruling
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VENEZUELA PRESIDENTIAL RECALL REFERENDUM, supra note 217.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
VENEZUELA PRESIDENTIAL RECALL REFERENDUM, supra note 217.
Id.
Id.
Sahar Aziz, Egypt’s Impeachment Alternative, SADA (Oct. 31, 2013),
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=53475 [hereinafter Impeachment Alternative].
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party. Consequently, during Mubarak’s era, the parliamentary majority was always reserved to the NDP, which rendered the country
without an effectively represented opposition. Similarly, during
Morsi’s era, the parliament was heavily dominated by Egypt’s Islamists, particularly the Freedom and Justice Party (“FJP”), the political
party of the Muslim Brotherhood, under the flag of which President
Morsi ran for the presidency.232 Thus, parliament, who initiates the
impeachment procedures, was always controlled by the president,
which rendered the whole process unlikely to occur.233
As previously mentioned, listing withdrawal of confidence as a
constitutional way to discharge the president aside from the impeachment device is likely to be interpreted as an attempt by the
drafters to curb the president by a parliamentary vote of no confidence rather than the ineffective impeachment device.
Therefore, the recall election could be the optimal alternative to
impeachment in Egypt. Egypt had a remarkable incident where certain elements of the recall device were prematurely tested. After public outrage escalated against President Morsi, the opposition urged
him to call for a recall election so that he could run again for the presidency; however, Morsi remained adamant and refused. A movement, named Tamarod (Rebel), formed with the intention of gathering signatures from citizens to call for President Morsi to step down
and allow an early presidential election.
Both the positions of the opposition, in gathering signatures calling for an early election, and of President Morsi, refusing to step
down, were justified. At first, it seems that the opposition sought to
avoid chaos that accompanied Mubarak’s removal by deferring to a
civilized, constitutional means of direct democracy in which ordinary
voters would be involved through signing petitions calling for an early presidential election. On the other hand, President Morsi’s conduct in refusing to call for an early election can be criticized for exposing the country to chaos and the climate of polarization between
his allies and opponents. He cannot be blamed constitutionally because, according to the 2012 Constitution, the only way to discharge
the president is either through his resignation or impeachment. Con-

232. Aziz, supra note 49.
233. Impeachment Alternative, supra note 231.
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sequently, since the constitution does not stipulate so, it would have
been just a presidential grant if Morsi had agreed to step down and
allow an early presidential election.234
Indeed, the process of initiating a petition and gathering signatures against President Morsi reveals the extent to which the Egyptians were near the recall device and how they sought the involvement of ordinary voters to overthrow Morsi when it was clear that the
parliament was too weak to initiate impeachment procedures against
the President. However, the only obstacle that the opposition met
was that the recall device was not recognized in the 2012 Constitution. It seems that the drafters of the 2014 Constitution did not realize
the importance of the recall in the Egyptian political system, since it
was excluded from the country’s current constitution.
Since the impeachment provision is unlikely to redress presidential misconduct for the reasons stated above, the recall device seems
to be the adequate alternative. In fact, an amendment is indispensable to adopt the recall device as a constitutional way to discharge the
president with Egypt’s current constitution. However, the question
is, how can the recall provision to be drafted?
First, the proposed provision should provide that the president
could be recalled after the expiration of half of the presidential term,
“two years.”235 In fact, two years will be sufficient to evaluate the
work of the president and his competency, as any judgment before
this period is likely to be hasty and premature. Second, the recall
provision should require that at least 40% of the registered voters (20
million)236 petition by gathering signatures, calling for a popular referendum to recall the president. Third, the president should be
deemed recalled if at least 45% of the total number of the registered
voters (22.5 million) vote in the referendum, provided that at least a
number of voters who elected the president vote “yes” to recall the
president.
234. Id.
235. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 140 (“The President of the Republic is elected for a period of four calendar years, commencing on the
day the term of his predecessor ends. The President may only be reelected once”).
236. The total number of the eligible registered voters in Egypt is estimated to be 50 million. Egyptian elections preliminary results, JADALIYYA (Jan. 9, 2012),
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3192/the-concise-idiots-guide-to-the-egyptianelections.
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Finally, the recall provision should also assign the task of receiving and checking the validity of the signatures and calling for the referendum to the National Elections Commission established by the
2014 Constitution,237 and specify that the Supreme Constitutional
Court (SCC) should oversee any dispute regarding the number and
validity of the gathered signatures. Further, the provision should
specify whether only ordinary voters have the right to participate in
the petition campaign or whether civil society organizations could be
involved as well.
However, the main drawback of the recall device is the lack of
definition of the misconduct required by the law to recall the official.
More specifically, the proposed recall provision should make clear
that the president must display certain misconduct such as malfeasance, misfeasance, or apparent incompetency to be recalled. Such a
requirement is very important in a country like Egypt where the opposition is far from being organized, and people are likely to be led
by the media to avoid removing a president for being unpopular and
to avoid harassing or threatening him. Further, if the impeachment
provision is to be revoked, defining what counts as presidential misconduct in the recall provision will be inevitable.
However, the recall mechanism could be challenging and risky
in that it could produce a polarized political atmosphere in which a
petition campaign could be initiated to remove the executive just for
his policy’s views,238 which might lead to political turmoil.239 Moreover, the process of gathering the required number of signatures
might be costly and require a dedicated number of individuals to
place the initiative on the ballot.240 Further, the fact that ordinary
voters who initiate the petition campaign bear the burden of proving
the official misconduct makes the process of holding the president
237. “The National Elections Commission is exclusively responsible for managing referenda and presidential, parliamentary and local elections, which includes the preparation
and update of a database of voters, proposal and division of constituencies, setting
regulations for and overseeing electoral campaigns, funding, electoral expenditure declaration thereof, and managing the procedures for out-of-country voting by expatriate
Egyptians, and other procedures, up to the announcements of results.” CONSTITUTION
OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 208.
238. CRONIN, supra note 182, at 146.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 62.
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accountable through the recall more challenging due to their inexperience and the difficulty of gaining access to official records and documents.241
Thus, criticism of the recall petition campaign for being lengthy
and costly could be contained by allowing volunteers from each province and registered civic organizations to participate under the supervision of the National Electoral Commission. Further, one could rely
on the role of political parties, impartial media, and civic community
awareness campaigns to train ordinary voters to initiate a petition and
to educate them that removing the president is a grave step, which
should be taken only with high caution when determined by a simple
yes or no vote.
Conclusion
In sum, given that Egypt’s impeachment clause is weak and
vague to effectively hold the president accountable, as well as the difficulty of proving official corruption in a court of law and the fact
that the recall device provides a reasonable and effective check on the
executive when the legislature is inefficient or corrupt; guarantees the
involvement of the people in the process of removing the elected official; increases trust in the elected official who survives a referendum; and limits undesirable factional interests that might steer the
impeachment vote in the legislature,242 the recall device seems to be a
good embodiment of accountability as well as an excellent alternative
to impeachment in Egypt.

241. Id. at 135.
242. Id. at 134–35. Indeed, ordinary voters might be directed by their factional interests in
initiating the petition campaign; however, such factional interests are likely not to be
as influential as law-makers during impeachment. Further, any factional interest or
malicious motive is likely to be defeated in the recall referendum. Id.
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